F.O.
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SUPPLIED
FOR THE
PUBLIC SERVICE

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

EE 1826/34

1952

PALESTINE

FROM Sir Henry Knight, Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC100

Dated 7th

Received in Registry—22nd May.

Resettlement programme in Jordan & Syria.

Discusses the programme at length.

Copied Damascus, Amman, Washington, & B.M.E.O. Beirut.

References

EE1826/8.

EE 1825/8

98512

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Copy) Russell Edmunds, Tay. 4 June and 10 June

Copy) Mr Myers, Beirut for Mr Evans. 3 June.

Copy) Mr Pollock Damascus. Furlong, Amman. Greenhill, W.Va. Dev. Dw, Beirut.

Russell Edmunds, Tay. 4 June

(Action completed) 19/6

(Index) 18/7

MINUTES

Copy to Col Russell Edmunds (Tay) with copy of attached interim reply.

28/5

19/6

41070

(AC 100)

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

7th May, 1952.

EE 1826/34

My dear Evans,

Referring to your letter EE 1826/8 of the 12th March, 1952, regarding approval to the general programme for UNRWA resettling refugees in Jordan at a cost of $11 million, and to the last sentence of your telegram No. 309 of the 19th April, 1952, regarding the settlement of 580,000 refugees in Syria. In these you say that it is assumed that individual projects will be examined in detail by the Agency and the Advisory Commission.

2. I have sent you yesterday a copy of the Director's proposal No. 35 regarding the Jordan programme, and of his Proposal No. 36 regarding Syria.

3. I also enclose a copy of Blandford's proposal No. 34 - "Decentralisation".

4. If the extensive programmes for Jordan and Syria are to be carried out in a reasonable time and in close co-operation with the Governments concerned, there seems certain that all the detailed preparation and the execution of the various projects will have to be done at "Country" level, without the continual reference to a red-tape-bound headquarters in Beirut, which has hitherto hampered UNRWA operations.

5. The matter has been discussed at intervals with the Advisory Commission and the Director, and at the last meeting the members of the Advisory Commission and the Director agreed on the following principles:-

(1) The Director and the Advisory Commission will approve the principles and standards to be applied to projects.

(2) General programmes will come up to the Advisory Commission and will be available for reference by the Advisory Commission to their own Governments.

(3) The Advisory Commission may ask that any project in a general programme be submitted to it in further detail or at a later stage.

(4) Normally, once the Advisory Commission has approved a general programme, the preparation and the execution of its projects will take place at country level.

(5) Detailed projects will be submitted to UNRWA headquarters only for the allotment of funds, if available.

(6) Periodical reports on each project will be available to the Advisory Commission.

6. Commenting on these items:-

(1) Will provide for type designs, typical maximum costs, standards of work, etc., for the objects for which projects should be designed, and the principles on which they should work. The Country Representatives will be responsible for applying these standards and principles to the various detailed projects. This should insure some uniformity and prevent extravagant or inadequate

/schemes.

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

3

schemes. It would protect Country Representatives from local pressure for grandiose designs, or for use of funds for non-refugee objects.

(2) The Advisory Commission Governments will be able to issue instructions to their representatives regarding general programmes and regarding any items which the Government may think the Advisory Commission ought to take further consideration of under item (3).

(4) The Country Representative, whose staff must be very considerably strengthened in ability, will be able to work out the projects in close consultation with the local Government, and without the latter complaining that every detail has to be referred to Beirut with consequent delay.

(6) The main supervision by the Advisory Commission, apart from informal consultations and visits, will be to see that reports are promptly submitted and adequate in content, to call attention at once to deviations from the standards or from the general programme, and to examine the prospects, good or bad, of each project in progress.

7. In the case of Jordan, it will be seen from the Director's Proposal No. 35 that the Development Bank, with some modifications, will be used to distribute the loans for, and to supervise the progress of, the industrial, trade and similar developments. The Agency will have to lay down principles regarding such loans, grants, recovery, supervision, etc., for its representative on the Board of the Bank to see that the Bank's funds are so employed. But we must assume that the Board of the Bank, consonant with such principles, will only finance those schemes which have some apparent prospects of success.

8. Personally, I doubt most of the schemes under Annex B, 3 - Industrial, Commercial and Banking, being likely to pay in the present condition of Jordan's economy, but clearly it would be impossible for the Advisory Commission to examine technically in detail the prospects of all these proposals, and this examination will have to be left to the Country Representative and the Bank. But the Advisory Commission may have to advise the early closing down of failures!

9. Annex C to the Director's Proposal No. 35 regarding education is, of course, a very bald outline and no information is yet available as to the details of carrying it out. I fear that UNRWA may not be able to find the necessary instructors, especially for technical and vocational training, in a reasonable time, and this difficulty will have to be considered by the Country Representative in making his plans.

10. The Advisory Commission, in accordance with the principles indicated in paragraph (5) above, accepted the rest of the Director's Proposal No. 35, with the exception that further consideration would be given to the last paragraph of the proposal, which is that UNRWA should get refugees off the ration rolls by giving them work on long-term productive projects for 2-3 years, leaving them to become finally self-supporting later on when the projects have been completed from funds other than UNRWA's.

11. I trust that the principles agreed by the Director and the Advisory Commission above may be accepted, for somehow the Country Representatives of UNRWA must be given the responsibility and the

/authority

authority to get these large programmes going without the delays inseparable from a centralized bureaucracy.

12. I am sending a copy of this letter to Montagu-Pollock, Furlonge, Greenhill and Development Division, B.M.E.O.

Yours sincerely,

H.F Knight

(H.F. KNIGHT)

UK. Add. C. 220 (4)

Eng. Copy No. 10 24th April, 1952 (a.c.

(a.c.21)

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 34

Subject: Decentralisation

For the record and for the convenience of the Advisory Commission, I would like to summarise briefly our current thinking and our present activities along the lines of decentralisation:

1. The Director is convinced that a programme of the dimension of $ 200 million cannot conceivably acquire the appropriate momentum if detailed review and decision is to take place at HQ. This is a long standing conclusion and one that we have been steadily implementing.

2. This premise is strongly supported, and in fact insisted upon by the Governments of the countries in which we hope to have our programme operative on a large scale. There is a real and psychological objection in these countries to having their programmes subject to detailed decision in "Lebanon".

3. Aside from the obvious necessities of speed, there is a basic desirability in sharing, if not shedding a maximum amount of political responsibility. One appealing form of progress in this direction is to create so-called intermediate corporations or instrumentalities for execution of the programme. The ultimate achievement in this direction would be to establish a grant-in-aid and technical assistance relationship with local governments. Under both of these forms of operation, it is clearly obvious that detailed review and decision at HQ is impractical and in fact contradictory.

4. Therefore, the present plan is to arrange for programme approval periodically in the form of categories of projects and major projects, these to be supplemented by HQ approval of the standards for the various categories. The Director intends to seek the advice of the Advisory Commission with respect to these basic decisions. Beyond that it is the present plan to decentralise the initiative and the decision as to detailed projects to the Country Representative.

By projects we mean a loan to establish a small enterprise, a scheme to improve an individual private land holding the construction of a rural village, or the launching of a training programme for motor mechanics.

The project action at the country level will be in the form of a joint agreement by the Country Representative of the Agency, and a representative of the Government. It must fall within an allotment for a particular category

/of project

of project and it must meet the standards for such an undertaking. Regular detailed progress reports must flow into HQ and will be available for the Advisory Commission.

5. I summarise this not so much because of its novelty but rather because it has grown up out of a number of discussions, formal and informal, Earlier discussion and confirmation of this arrangement will be found here and there in various memoranda sent by the Director to the Advisory Commission.

John B. Blandford, Jr.

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

Distribution:

Director	Copy No. 1	
Deputy Director	2	
Legal Advisor	3	
Comptroller	4	
Reports Officer	5	
Adcom. Secretary	5	thru 15
Translation Section	16	
Director's Files	17	
Director's " (Conf.)	18	

EE 1826/34.
CONFIDENTIAL.

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

OUTFILE

3rd June, 1952.

Please refer to Sir Henry Knight's letter AC 100 of the 7th May, regarding Advisory Commission control of projects.

2. I agree that if rapid progress is to be made with the execution of projects, the maximum possible freedom must be given to the people on the spot and that Headquarters interference must be kept down to the minimum compatible with the efficient use of funds. At first sight, the "principles" approved by the Director of the Advisory Commission and referred to in paragraph 5 of Sir Henry Knight's letter, appear to strike the right balance. The third principle in particular gives the Advisory Commission and the Governments represented on it sufficient opportunity for intervention when required. I will write to you again when I have had an opportunity to consult the Treasury and also Sir Henry Knight who has now returned here.

3. When Locke was here we discussed in a general way the problem of meeting resettlement projects and how they could be executed with the necessary speed and efficiency, and tentatively came to the conclusion that the Agency and local Governments would probably make full use of firms of contractors both foreign and local. Has this possibility been examined in detail by the Agency ?

4. I was relieved to see that the Advisory Commission reserved its position regarding the last paragraph of the Director's Proposal No. 35. What are the "other funds" which, it is assumed, will look after the half re-integrated refugees when the Agency operations have come to an end ? Clearly this possibility is one that needs to be very carefully considered from the point of view of the interests of both the Jordan Government and Her Majesty's Government and I shall discuss the implications with Sir Henry Knight.

5. Copies of this letter are being sent to the recipients of Sir Henry Knight's letter.

O. H. Myers, Esq.,

c/o H.M. Legation,

BEIRUT.

(T. E. Evans.)

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/35

FROM Sir Henry Knight, Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC 100/7

Dated 13th } May.

Received in Registry— 22nd }

Resettlement in Jordan.

Comments on some of Mr. Blandford's proposals.

References

EE1826/34.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Col Russell Edmunds, Tsy.

9 June

(Action completed) 9/6

(Index) 14/6

MINUTES

Copy to Tsy (Col. Russell-Edmunds).

Sec-134 20/5

41070

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

(AC 100/7)

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

EE 1826/35

13th May, 1952.

My dear Evans,

With reference to your letter (EE 1826/8) of the 12th March, 1952, dealing with Treasury letter (IF 48/018) of the 11th March, 1952.

2. After very considerable effort I have now managed to get UNRWA's comments on the view that the Advisory Commission should have the opportunity to examine Part II projects of the Jordan Programme in detail and to consult, if necessary, the Foreign Office. Blandford says in a letter of the 6th May that he feels that projects of the type in Part II should come to Beirut for review.

EE 1823/14 EE 1826/34

3. The Jordan Programme has meanwhile undergone some modification and I sent a copy of Blandford's proposal No. 35 under my letter (AC 100/3A) of the 6th May on the lines on which it is proposed the Director and Advisory Commission should examine programmes, mentioned in para. 5 of my letter (AC 100) of the 7th May, 1952. I should assume that under these proposals we should lay down the guiding principles for the Part II schemes, if any such materialise, and in a number of cases reserve for detailed consideration the more important such schemes, but would not bother about the details of minor loans, village housing and the like.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/36

1952

FROM Sir Henry Knight, Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC 100/34
Dated 16th
Received in Registry — 22nd } May.

Resettlement.

Encloses copy of a note on Mr. Blanford's report of his discussion with Brigadier Sele.

References

EE1826/32.

MINUTES

copy to Treasury (Sir Russell Edmunds) & resubmit.

24/5

18/6

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8 Dep. (Russell Edmunds)

June

(Action completed)

19/6

(Index)

41070

(AC 100/3A)

CONFIDENTIAL

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

16th May, 1952.

E 1826/36

My dear Evans,

I enclose a copy of a note I made on what Blandford told me of his discussion with Selo on the 14th.

2. I hesitate to dogmatise as to the real meaning of Selo's attitude, but I think that the points on the second page of the note are probably correct, i.e., that Selo would take the refugees if adequate extra money be put up for general economic development.

3. Whether this would be available, or, rather, whether the U.S.A. and the International Bank would think it worth while taking a gamble that this would end the refugee problem, I do not know. Locke has not yet returned, and Bergus has no real knowledge of what the State Department may think.

4. I am sending copies of this note to Montagu-Pollock, Rapp and Furlonge, and still keeping my fingers crossed.

Yours sincerely,

H F Knight

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

24

Note of Blandford's account of talk with Gen Selo 14.5.52

Talk lasted 4 hours; Selo's illness obviously genuine as he had difficulty in getting up from his chhir.

Blandford got no signed document out of Selo, but is convinced that Selo wants to find a way of settling the refugees.

Blandford emphasised the urgency of the situation, regarding starting work, educational buildings, winter coming on again, getting equipment and finance, our report to UN etc.

Selo is anxious to have something definite to announce to the Syrian public, when he announces the UNRWA programme, which will show that not only the refugees are to benefit, but that help is being given to the Syrian nationals and the the Syrian economy. He hoped that Blandford appreciated his difficulty, no previous Syrian Government had dared do so much.

Blandford explained that the UNRWA programme would benefit greatly Syria's own economy, e.g. it would give the man power to let Syria grow more crops, the new farmers would pay more taxes, there would beincreased production of all sorts of crops and commod--ities, and UNRWA expenditure would provide much foreign exchange f for Syria. It reality the UNRWA plan was not separate from the general economic development of Syria, but an integral part of it.

Selo recognised that to some dgree thsi is so, but objected that in his view only two fiths of the proposed 170 million dollars which would be spent by UNRWA in Syria, would really form part of Syria's own preposed 200 million dollars public works programme; for instance the expenditure by UNRWA on houses, plough cattle implements, layout of villages and their ancillary buildings do not form part of Syria's plans and could not be considered as part of them, for Syria does not provided such amenzities for settlers on it's schemes for irrigation.

Blandford contestedthis view and said that a larger part of UNRWA expenditure would be part of permanent development benefitting Syrian nationals as well as refugees. (Blandford will try and work out a more accurate figure forthis.)

Selo asked where he could get the rest of the money to carry out Syria's 2oo million dollar development scheme, as UNRWA might be contributing really only some 75 million dollars towards it. He saw only two sources, the International Bank and the USA Govt. He thought that the Bank would provide probably for three projects possibly some 30 millions.

Blandford asked if Syria would accept direct aid from the USA Govt and Selo said that he would , provided there was nox threat to Syria's independence. But that 8 million dollars would not be enough. (where he got this figure Blandford did not know.)

Selo emphasised that Syria had taken more action against Communism than any other country..he instancedthe number of Communist deputies in the Italian Parliament and in the Knesst) and yet it did not get the aid which it deserved, and which other less deserving countries in the struggle against Communism were getting. He added that without Syria's help the Arab refugees could never be sttled.

Blandford again emphasised our need to get a start with something, and Selo said he wanted to announce his whole programme a at one time and for this need our help as to where the balance is to come from, and suggested another meeting on 22.5.52.

Blandford while admitting that this might be for delay or for bargaining, thinks personnally that Selo and Shishakly really want to align Syria with the West but in an attitude of independence, and that therefore the matter of refugee settlemnt in Syria should be treated as only a part of the much larger question of the development of Syria, but an integral and indivisible part of it. If e.g. UNRWA's contribution to the general development should be accpted to amount say to 100 millions, there ought to be no difficulty in the Int Bank lending 50 and USA Govt granting 50.m.

The Int Bank is I gather thinking of financing Latakia communications andother roads. Selo suggested that if UNRWA built irrigation schemes the Bank could do the roads.

Selo did not mention the provision of military aid and Blandford did not raise it of course

D. Stevens of the Int Bank apparentl thinks that UNRWA and the Bank should join in on the Yusuf Pasha scheme, and that Locke is suggesting USA bilateral aid for Latakia and Yusuf Pasha.

In Blandford's

In Blandford's view, Selo is offering
(1) complete alignment against Communism .(Selo says that his regime in Syria is really more democratic than these in the other Arab States.)
(2) to take over all the refugees
But
(1) Selo needs money from other sources , and this money and UNRWA funds must go together
(2) without this financial help, it would be very difficult for Selo to come out with any announcement

Blandford found Selo most friendly in the discussion.

15.5.52.

ADDENDUM TO NOTE ON BLANDFORD'S ACCOUNT
OF TALK WITH GENERAL SELO ON 14TH MAY, 1952

Blandford emphasizes that he asked whether Syria would accept direct aid from the U.S.A. Government because Selo had previously implied that he would not. Blandford is not pushing American help.

Blandford added that at the end of the interview he emphasized that delay in starting projects might mean loss of 20 millions of U.S.A. money, and asked whether UNRWA could not start at once. Selo then authorised Dr. Dauwdi to go into this with Depage and proceed with vocational training and some public land project, either near Palmyra or east of the Homs road. This means in effect sanction to start the interim $30 million programme in a quiet way.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/37

FROM Sir Henry Knight, Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC.218

Dated 16th May.

Received in Registry— 22nd May.

Resettlement in Jordan.

Encloses a note on a talk with Mr. Blandford.

Copied Amman & Fayid.

References

EE 1826/36 (last paper)

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) [signature] 31/5

(Index) [signature] 6/6

MINUTES

We shall have to discuss with Sir H Knight the point X in the note. It looks like pulling out on the part of UNRWA & leaving the Jordan govt with the baby. Until the bulk of the refugees are transferred to Syria, this would be very dangerous from the Jordan (& our) point of view.

M. Hunter. [signature] 23/5

The 2,000 families would just about be the most that Jordan has been estimated as capable of absorbing, so would not leave much room for adjustment. The $3m, one must assume, would be for maintenance costs, not for resettlement, for which they could hardly be enough.

I agree that at the present stage this would be a leap in the dark.

[signature] 24.V.

41070

The $3m is for resettlement as well as relief, I think, i.e. at the rate of $1500 per family. M. Hunter [signature] 27.V & B.U. 29/5 [signature] 29/5 [signature] 30/5

Confidential

(AC218)

16-5-52

FE1826/37

My dear Evans

I enclose note of talk with Blandford re Jordan.

I am sending copies to Furlonge & Rapp.

[signature]

Note re Blandford's account of his recent visit to Jordan. 1.5.52.

Blandford was in Amman for several days last week and cleared up a lot of things. In his view UNRWA matter are now moving forward , especially as far as Suleiman Pasha Sukkar and Anastase Bey Hanaia are concerned. Blandford has formally handed to the Prime Minister proposals for thw 11 million dollar programme.

Blandford does not see how more than some 5000 families of refugees can be resettled inside our three year period in Jordan on our basis of making them self supportihg in that period. We shall have to look to Part II of the programme and there the opportunities seem to be (1) the Yarmuk
(2) Phosphates
(3) Potash
(4) treeplanting of olives and other fruit trees.

X He wants to explore tha possibility of UNRWA handing over to the Jordan Govt, say, 3 million dollars and some 2000 families for whom the GOvt would take entire responsibility, this would save UNRWA some 300,000 dollars a year at 150 dollars a year in relief cost. But as yet nothing formal has been discussed on these lines.

(As regards the Yarmuk the Pt IV Irrigation expert Bunger seems to have altered his view since I was in Amman a week ago, and there seems more chanceof something practical being done. Presumably a report of the meeting last week has been sent by Crawford.)

There seems in Jordan no major outlet for refugees escept the Yarmuk scheme, but if other sthan refugees are to benefit then other funds than UNRWA's should also contribute. D. Stevens of the I ternational Bank seemed interested when Blanfdford saw him in Damascus.

A big metals expert oftheUSA one Weare(?) is coming out to the NE on leave shortly and likely to look into the Jordan mining prospects, but apparently he does not think that the Jordan phosphstes can ever payunder the present transport possibil--ities.

HG 5.52.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... FO .....

Class ..... 371 .....

Piece ..... 98512 ...

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

EE. 1826/38

Greasy
16/4/82.

IN PLACE
19/7/07

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

GERMANY: SUPPLIES

E E 1826/38

FROM

Chancery
Beirut
~~to~~ E. Dept

No. 1071/9/2/52.

Dated

Received in Registry— 27.5.52 4.6.52

Possible conference of Arab Refugees at Damascus.

Discusses the visit to Damascus & Beirut of Tewfik Said Toukan, on behalf of an Egyptian organisation called the "Arab Union"

(add to BMEO Fayid of 2TT Ray.)

Last Paper

(Minutes.)

E Dept 9/6

CW 7/6

References

-/33

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 9/6

(Index) 14/6

Next Paper

34839

BRITISH LEGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT.

(1071/9/2/52)

27th May, 1952.

Dear Chancery,

In your letter 107/3/2 of the 12th of May you asked us for any information we had about a possible conference of Arab refugees at Damascus on the 15th of August.

2. We do not know anything specific about such a conference, but [redacted] tell us that Tewfik Said Toukan did in fact recently visit Damascus and Beirut. Damascus can no doubt tell you more about his visit there, but he seems to have claimed that he was acting on behalf of an organisation of Egyptian origin called "The Arab Union", and to have urged Shishakli and Selo to resist refugee resettlement, if necessary by re-arming the refugees themselves for this purpose.

3. When here he had interviews with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the President's Chef de Cabinet and with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While here he seems to have represented himself as strongly opposed to the policy of the ex-Mufti - although this claim accords ill with his apparent activities at Damascus.

4. Toukan went round saying that he had already talked to General Franco, the King of Libya and the King of Jordan on this subject, but as he claimed to met the President of the Lebanese Republic (which he did not) his other claims may be equally false.

5. Amman can no doubt tell you more about Toukan's background. He appears to hold no official government position in Jordan, but to be a plausible and unscrupulous adventurer whose main interest at present is in trading in scrap metal.

6. We are sending copies of this letter to Chanceries at Amman, Damascus and Cairo and to Eastern Department.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

BRITISH LEGATION BEIRUT

Chancery,
British Middle East Office,
FAYID.

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1959

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/39

FROM

Mr Myers, Beirut. to Mr Evans.

No. OHM/M/1.

Dated 30.5.52.

Received in Registry— 4.6.52.

Resettlement of Refugee Tubesmen.

He has been asked by Mr Blandford to try & undertake to resettle the refugee tubesmen & get them off the ration rolls..

References

MINUTES

Pl. make for the file 2 copies of Mr Myers' paper (attached) & return the original to him.

See 144 & 149.

CW 14/7

(Print)

See within.

A) Mr Myers, Beirut, to Miss Waterlow (OHM/N/1 of 13 June.)

CW 2/8.

(How disposed of)

Mr Myers Beirut ~~Df) Miss Waterlow~~ for Miss Waterlow

10 June.

PWA/ Encl. ret'd to Mr Myers Beirut 1 Aug.

(Action completed) 6/8

(Index) 10/10

41070

later

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

E

OHM/M/1

CONFIDENTIAL

30th May, 1952.

Dear Evans,

E E 1826/39

Refugee Tribesmen

Sir Henry submitted my note on this subject to Blandford in August last year and although it has been brought up again more than once by his officers, he has repeatedly ignored it. A suggestion about improvement of pasturage was also ignored until the planting season was over when Blandford told Conrad that such a project did not fall within UNRWA's sphere.

2. However, about three days before Sir Henry's departure Blandford asked whether I would undertake for him to try to get these people "resettled" and off the ration rolls. I pointed out that he had chosen a rather difficult time, but with Sir Henry's approval agreed to do what I could to get such a project started. I hope to persuade Blandford to let Group-Captain Dudley Marsack undertake the job if I find that there is anything which can be done.

3. In fulfilment of this plan I am leaving Beirut early on Monday the 2nd June for Damascus and Amman and will be returning on Thursday or Friday, the 5th or 6th.

4. I cannot say I am very hopeful, particularly as the necessary preliminary steps that were long ago suggested have not been taken. Blandford is still under the impression that all "Bedouins" of Palestine are true nomads, whereas, of course, there are

T.E. Evans, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

/extremely

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

extremely few, or none, of these. However, there are some semi-sedentary and semi-nomadic tribes with whom it may be possible to do something.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

Middle East Secretariat,

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

EE 1826/39.
CONFIDENTIAL.

10th June, 1952.

With reference to your letter of the 30th May, to Trevor Evans (who is away on leave), I am sorry to say that we cannot trace having received the note on refugee ~~problems~~ which you gave to Sir Henry Knight last year. Can you send us a copy by the next bag ?

(C. Waterlow.)

O. H. Myers, Esq.
c/o The British Legation,
Beirut.

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
Beirut.

(O[redacted]/N/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

13th June, 1952.

INDEXED
E 1826/39

Dear Miss Waterlow,

Please refer to your letter EE 1826/39 of the 10th June, 1952.

2. I am sorry also that the Foreign Office should have lost its copy of this note as the U.S. Delegation lost theirs and UNRWA has lost about three copies.

3. However, I have found the one which I enclose, but I should be grateful for its return as soon as you have finished with it.

4. I shall be sending shortly a copy of my final suggestions for the operation of getting nomads off relief, after which I hope the whole matter will be in Marsack's hands.

Yours ever,

(O.H. MYERS)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

MYERS' COPY

27/8/51

OHM/4/11

THE TRIBES OF PALESTINE

UNRWA has on its registers the following numbers of refugees classed as "Bedouins":-

District	Families	Persons
Gaza	8,404	48,716
Jordan	10,464	51,479
(plus recent arrivals)	630	3,936
Lebanon	1,597	7,967
Syria (exact figure not known)	3,000 ?	15,000 (circa)
Israel	200 ?	1,122
	22,500 circa	128,220
Israel has registered "Nomads"		18,000
There are in Jordan and Gaza a number of non-refugee tribesmen		???
Grand total of Palestinian tribesmen, more than		146,000

The tribal refugees as registered therefore represent about 15% of the total and their affairs are therefore deserving of attention. In a way the matter is both more and less important than it seems, for the figure is certainly inflated, probably by 15,000 to 20,000 (1) owing to the great difficulties of an orderly census of the nomadic tribes, so that while there are fewer than appears, UNRWA is paying more in surplus rations to this group (or rather part of it) than to any other group of refugees.

The term "Bedouins" is both misleading and etymologically impossible (2), it leads people to think that UNRWA has on its hands about 130,000 Badû , that is desert nomads living entirely upon the products of their flocks, whereas it is extremely improbable that it has as many as 1,000 if any. The term as it was used in Palestine under the mandate, and following mandatory custom by UNRWA, means all Arabs with any kind of tribal organization and it should be clearly understood that almost all these people are agriculturists in varying degrees, some of them as settled and as skilled as fellahîn. To ignore this may lead to injustice and muddle, and it is suggested that the word "tribes", used in Transjordan during the mandate, is vastly preferable and should be substituted for "Bedouins".

There are two ways in which the tribes present a special problem for relief and three ways in which they may do so when it comes to reintegration.

The first difficulty is the mobility of those who have remained even partiallynomadic, who can move rapidly from place to place and get themselves registered more than once. It has even come to light that some of them living in Israel cross the border at intervals to draw UNRWA rations in Jordan. The second difficulty arises from their social outlook. The tribes consider themselves as Herrenvolk, a superior (ex) warrior caste and are to some extent so considered by the fellahin, by whom they are disliked and feared. Consequently they will not normally enter into camps with other people but move about at their

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(1) The best figure I have been able to obtain for tribesmen under the mandate is 113,000, a natural increase of 3.5 % per annum would bring this figure up to 133,000 or 13,000 less than our grand total excluding non-refugees of Gaza and West Jordan. This agree fairly well with the estimate of the numbers in excess of the truth given to me by our investigating officers.

(2) Badâ - to wander in the desert (al-bâdîah), al-badû - wanderers in the desert, sing. badawîî, fem. badawiyyah (pl. badawiyyât). The origin "Bedouins" or "Bedawins" isclearly that some traveller made the wrong Arabic plural from badawîî, and others, more ignorant still, mistook this for the singular and added an 's' to pluralize it.

about at their own sweet will, coming to centres for distribution and treatment, and thus making administration more difficult. (3)

When it comes to re-integration the first difficulty is social, the semi-nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes show considerable internal cohesion in addition to their rather xenophobic attitude towards non-tribal neighbours. Moreover, owing to the use made by the mandatory powers of the 'paramount sheikhs', they and their families have gained a very considerable hold over the tribes. Originally the Sheikh of a Qabîlah (large tribe) was simply the 'ambassador' of the tribe, being primus inter pares among the Sheikhs of the sub-tribes. He has been raised to the position of a princeling. Some of them even sold tribal land to the Jews and pocketed the money themselves. It is therefore contrary to the interests of these leaders that the tribe should be split - and they have this strong tribal sentiment on which to play.

It will therefore be a difficult thing to split a tribe - especially for an outside agency, which depends largely on the willingness of the people to achieve effective action, though local Governments may be able to overcome the resistance if they are willing to try. It may however come more naturally to the latter to leave the problem as long as possible thereby increasing the difficulty as the available land decreases in quantity and variety.

Where an entire tribe consists of refugees the difficulty could be solved, once the correct numbers are established, by settling them all together, provided always that they will agree to the chosen site, that neighbouring tribes do not object, and that a large enough slice of land is available. Some of the tribes are large, counting over 5,000 people (the Tarabîn are 23,000) requiring from 75,000 to 250,000 dunums exclusive of pasturage (Tarabîn 345,000 to 1,150,000).

However, it seems probable that in the Gaza strip will be found tribes part of which are refugees and part non-refugees; it would therefore be desirable that every effort should be made to re-integrate tribes thus distributed in any available neighbouring land available, and now that some offers of land have been made at Gaza the matter is urgent.

When it comes to housing it may be found that some tribes or parts of tribes prefer to live in tents, in fact some badû who have lived all their lives in tents cannot bear to sleep in a house, saying that they are afraid of the roof falling in on them - in other words they suffer from claustrophobia. The same phenomenum is said still to exist among the Palestine tribes. It will be to the advantage of the Agency to know who these people are as badawîî tents, though now expensive, are still much cheaper than houses.

The third problem is occupational. As stated above, there are extremely few nomads among the Palestinian tribes, who range from semi-nomadic to sedentary. It is most important that any plan for re-integration should take their occupation into account, for it would, of course, be disastrous if some people with vague tribal affiliations, whose livelihood had been made out of selling postcards to tourists, were given a tent each, some camels and sheep and launched into a hostile desert. The converse is equally true.

Moreover, if properly handled these varieties of means of livelihood may prove an advantage. For example, it is understood that in the

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(3) It is worth noting that this outlook on life led in the pas t to any tribe, however settled, to claim to be badû but that among some of the settled people this has now changed. At Khân ash-Shafîdh the tribes objected to the term which they said was Jewish propaganda , invented to show that they could all live in the desert and thus justify stealing their lands (the title deeds of which many of them still hold.)

that in the Shi[illegible] it may be possible to provide a small irrigated plot for each family, insufficient for its entire support, and that at the same time in years of poor rainfall rainfed crops would fail. For such a scheme semi-nomadic people would be ideal, living partly on their irrigated land, sowing some catch crops of barley and depending largely on their flocks and herds. Admittedly the Jordan Government would have the right to object to UNRWA's selection of settlers, either totally or individually, but it is surely the responsibility of UNRWA to know its refugees so that it can suggest for any settlement plan a group of refugees, suitable socially and economically, and to have alternative groups read in case of objection by the host Government to the first selection. After all, the Governments cannot be expected to know all about the refugees, and to obtain the information seems only a reasonable precaution against delay. (Itmay be added that a classification of fellahîn according to the type of agriculture they practiced, the region where they worked, etc. seems equally necessary.)

Another example appearing todemand urgent consideration is that of Sinai, where a priori there would be a greater chance of success for sedentary tribesmen among their new tribal neighbours than there would be, for example, for hill agriculturists from North Palestine. Should not UNRWA be in a position to offer reasonable suggestions about the people to be settled there if drilling should prove water to be adequate? (On the ethnological side no-one could give better advice than Mr. G. W. Murray now with the Desert Institute in Sinai).

Since some tribes are split between Jordan, Gaza, and Israel, and others between Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon, any detailed investigation would have to be centralised and cover the whole territory, though much of it could be done through the present UNRWA personnel.

Suggestion. It is suggested that an Advisor on Tribal Affairs should be engaged to deal with all aspects of the matter throughout the territories. Most of his work could be done through and with other Departments but he would require one or perhaps two Palestinian assistants and a bilingual (English and Arabic) Secretary-Typist. The Advisor would have to be an expert Arabist, familiar with tribal affairs and preferably known to and knowing the Palestinian tribes. The writer could make suggestions if required.

As the result of a superficial investigation some idea of what would be required has been gathered and a little fragmentary information collected which is given in Appendix A by way of illustration. Appendix B is a study of the Nejeb tribes by Mr. Shuhaiber an investigator in the Jeruslaem Office, while Appendix C gives sources of information.

Duties of the Tribal Officer.

UNRWA's information on the tribes is generally speaking totally inadequate, and it is partly due to this that ~~xxxxx xxx~~ so many supplus rations are drawn by them. It is not very difficult for a man to invent new names for himself and for members of his family and to know his qabîlah is of little help, but it would be very much more difficult for him to falsify his whole tribal organization and frauds would be much more easily discovered.

Whether a new census should be held or not is a question that needs careful consideration in conference with the C.D.Os. If it were done much stricter controls would be necessary than have heretofore been used. Proper steps would have to be taken to inform them in advance, they would have to be grouped into certain centres (at least in Jordan), the full co-operation of the Government and the forces of security would be needed, and some physical method of marking those who had been registered would be necessary - such as a dye lasting a week into which one finger could be dipped.

The reaction wouldcertainly be violent and goodwill would be lost. On the other hand not only would a big leak be stopped, but it will be easier to persuade people to resettle eslewhere if they are only drawing their proper rations than itnwould be if the family has two extra rations with which to purchase amenities and supplementary necessities. The reaction might be less violent and it might in the long run be best for UNRWA to"hold" all extra ration cards collected against any possible further ejections from Israel.

If a census were held it is clear that before it were undertaken the investigators should be familiar with the best information obtainable and should have with them lists of the tribes and their divisions and sub-divisions (see App. A.) as complete as possible. This would enable them to check considerably during the investigation.

A rough estimate of the cost of such a census is round about £9000 a sum that might well be saved in one month's rations. The Comte de Briey could doubtless give a better figure.

It is tentatively suggested that if such a census were held the heading "Occupation" and its sub-headings should be changed to read somewhat as follows:-

A. Affiliation

Group	Sheikh
Qabilah (Where applicable)	
Ashirah	
Fakhadh, batn, or equivalent	
Fa:ilah or equivalent	

B. Degree of nomadism

Prefer to inhabit tent or house?
Whether cultivated tribally owned land?
Whether owned land personally? If so, how much?
(Check with title deeds if held)
Nos. of animals: Horses- Camels Cattle Sheep Goats

Of course the figures for animals and land would be exaggerated but the results should give a broad indication as to the livelihood of the group.

Re-integration.

When the time came to settle the nomads (if any), the semi-nomads, and semi-sedentaries, not only would the best information be necessary both as to the economic status and the social orgnaization, but, in addition to finding land and obtaining Governmental consent, UNRWA would have to persuade the Sheikhs to move there and it or the Government concerned would have to negotiate meetings between the incoming sheikhs and those of the tribes in the neighbourhood to guard against an outbreak of inter-tribal warfare.

Careful negotiation might enable some units to be slipped into the territory of an existing tribe. Offers of this nature came from Cyrenaica as long ago as February and the first move towards following them up has just taken place.

These are matters for a Tribal Advisor and if the right man were found it might come about that some of the semi-nomadic tribes could be settled sooner than the fellahin.

This preliminary investigation was started as the result of a suggestion made by the Comte de Briey and as will be seen in Appendix C he has since aquired several useful reference works and additional information, as well as further copies of Appendix B which was received from him. All his staff have been most co-operative. The

The C.D.O. Jordan has already submitted a memorandum to the Assistant Director urging a centralised control of the tribes. Everwhere all UNRWA officers were most helpful and I believe that everywhere a clarification of the issues would be welcomed.(3) It must be said, however that at Gaza the tribes do not present an unusually difficult problem for relief.

I would like to add as a tailpiece that nothing that I saw in this very superficial investigation could justify the tribes from having half instead of whole rations. At the beginning many of them had their animals and this measure was probably justified but very few appear to have any now. It is true that there are wealthy individuals among them - but that is a separate matter.

N.B. Appendix B. is submitted with top copy only. A more complete list of tribes and sub-tribes of the Nejeb could now rapidly be prepared from Sarif Pasha al Sarif's books (see App. C.). To this appendix have been attached some lists of tribesmen registered for rations. It will be seen that owing to there having been no expert guidance on the subject, tribes, sub-tribes, divisions and even clans are listed as if each was a separated and equal unit. This is no-one's fault and is inevitable unless there is someone experienced in the matter to give guidance.

The system of transliteration employed in this note is that proposed in my memorandum to the Director of July 24th.

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(3) Glubb Pasha approved of the idea of an enquiry and suggested that in Jordan it could be carried out for us by the Arab Legion.

APPENDIX A

SOME NOTES ON THE PALESTINE TRIBES

Economic

In Palestine the tendency since the beginning of the mandate has been steadily towards sedentarization. In times of stability and order, when raiding becomes a doubtful livelihood and agriculture secure, this tendency has always shown itself in the cultivable areas, the nomads pressing into the edge and settling down and the cultivated area itself extending into the marginal lands. As recently as 1929 the tribes of the Nejeb spoke feelingly of the fear of raids from the East as a thing of the recent past but which might well recur at any time, but by the end of the mandate the vast majority of the tribes were settled in some degree - there being an almost infinte gradation from nomad to sedentary.

At one end of the scale are the completely sedentary, living in houses, cultivating the land, but retaining some degree of tribalism, or perhaps only a memory of tribalism. For settlement purposes these could be treated as fellahîn except that it might be necessary to keep together a larger block than would be necessary with the latter. The strength of tribal organization among these people needs investigation to discover the units which would have to be moved in a block - a factor which will doubtless vary from group to group according to the period for which they have been settled. In Gaza there are about 13,000 tribesemen classed under the (rather curious) heading "Northern Bedouins and Mixed Villages" who are said to be all sedentary and to owe allegiance now only to their local mukhtârs and not the qabîlah from which they originally sprang. The largest single group is given as 287 families, there are two other groups of over 200 families and two of over 100 families, the remainder being mostly of 50 families or less. A large number of the tribesmen in Syria and the Lebanon will probably prove to be sedentary.

The next group is the semi-sedentary which may be defined as being composed of tribesmen living mainly on cultivation but having flocks as well and leaving their agricultural land from time to time to go to pastures. Among these there is likely to be little hard and fast division between house and tent dwellers. Opinion suggest that this would vary from tribe to tribes, sub-tribe to sub-tribe and even clan to clan. Moreover, in general the younger people would welcome houses while the older would refuse to sleep in them. The sheikhs of the tribes at Khan ash-Shaîkh camp informed me that they usually owned each a house and a tent. Semi-sedentaries would be ideal people for lands adjoining pasturage from which a supplementary income could be drawn.

Semi-nomadic are those whose main income comes from flocks and herds but who also practice some agriculture. Ideally, this group could be more clearly defined from the previous by including only those tribes in which the individual owns no land but the tribal lands are in part cultivated annually with a scratch crop of barley. There are probably, however, very few left in this state among the Palestinian tribes. Obviously they are suitable for land where a small irrigated plot can be provided and where the neighbouring land is more suitable for pasture than for rainfed agriculture.

It would probably be difficult to split semi-sedentary and still more semi-nomads into units smaller than the qabîlah , except in so far as the units remained within the territory known to them - such as the Jordan -Palestine area. The difficulties may however be exaggerated and investigation is required.

Finally the nomad is clearly defined as a person living entirely upon the produce of his animals and doing no cultivation. Such people require only a tent, a camel or two and a flock of sheep. (An accurate estimate of the numbers of sheep has yet to be made, data can be obtained from Mr. Sâmi wafad ad-Dijâni (App. C.)

Soc[illegible]

The structure of a Badawî tribe is broadly as follows:-

Qabîlah (Pl. qabâ:il) Tribe. The head is the paramount sheikh and is usually the sheikh of the most important sub-tribe.
ʿashîrah (pl. ʿashâ:ir) Sub-tribe. (literally 'tribe' and in fact the smaller indpendant tribes are referred to as such and not as qabâ:il and the plural is used in Arabic with reference to "the tribes" as a whole.
Fakhadh (pl. Afkhâdh) or Baṭn (pl. buṭûn) Division. (lit."thigh" and "belly" respectively.)
ʿa:îlah (pl. ʿa:ilat) Clan. (lit."family" , but the word here means a group of people allegedly descended from a common ancestor and it seems best to reserve the word "family" for its European sense in which it is already employed in the census.

It should be remarked that the custom as to the naming of the various units making up a tribe varies from qabîlah to qabîlah. For example, in Cyrenaica ʿa:ilah is used for division and baît (lit. "house") for clan.

The following is an illustration of the working of the system among the Ṭanâjirah, one of the larger qabâ:il of the Beer Sheba region, most of whom are on our ration lists.

The ʿashâ:ir are:- The Abû Midaîn , Abû Ḍâhir, Smîrî, Nuṣaîrât.

The Abû Midaîn is composed as follows:-

Buṭûn	ʿa:ilat	No. of families.	Persons.
Badarîn	Abû Midaîn	(Not investigated)	
	Nabahîn		
	Rawâsîn		
	Ijlaîlât		
	Qrâiniyyin (or Qrâinî)		
	Abû ʿaûdât		
	Al ʿawwâd		
	Abû Saʿîd		
	Abû Ruwaîdah		
	Abû Fayyâdah		
	Ibn Saʿdî		
	Abu Ṣlayyaṭ (or Ṣalîṭ)		
ʿarahîn	Abu Ghûlah	(children of a female vampire)	
	Abû Hijaîr		
	" ʿayyâdah		
	" Malû		
	ʿarabîn		
	Abû ʿiṭaîwah (or ʿiṭâwî)		
Nukhaîlât	Abû Zakari		
	" Miraṭîl		
	" ʿajamî (or ʿajamîn)	(Persians)	
	Ibn Hûti	(son of a whale)	
An-Nuʿaîmât	Abû Ghirghûd		
	ʿarûji	(the lame)	
	Abû Ghibân	(the unjust)	
	" Hilû		
	" Khaṭṭâb		
	Quṣhân		
	Abû Khalîl		
	" Ghayyâḍ		
	" Shiraîf		
	" Dîb	(the wolf)	
Naʿmân	Naʿmân		

Notes:- (i) The above information was obtained from Sheikh Muṣṭafá abû Midaîn, brother of Sheikh ʿalî who is paramount sheikh of the Hanâjirah and from some friends of the writer in the same tribe, The Sheikh stated that the people are all agriculturists and that most of them would prefer houses to tents if given the choice. They would want to move together or stay together, some being refugees and some not. They might be persuaded to go to a new place if the offer were a reasonable one. UNRWA has 839 families comprising 4827 persons on their lists from this qabîlah which the Sheikh claimed to have 10,000 persons.

(ii) Some of the names are purely badawî and as the pundits have not admitted the badawî dialect into the cannon of classical Arabic they are considered to be colloquial, however, as they have no true equivalent in classical Arabic they have been left as they are.

Some names can be given in different ways, as the ʿajamîn above. Abû is frequently used among these people as the equivalent of "His father was" or "Their father was" and is the same as banî or ûalâd.

(iii) The few unusual names which have been translated have been so done purely for interest. Complimentary names are often avoided in order to avert the evil eye and the tribes, particularly badû, make little use of the conventional names of the Apostles and the "Rightly-guided-ones" - probably because they carry on the pre-Islamic tradition of naming.

The investigation was totally inadequate to make more than a guess at the numbers still subject to tribal authority but a guess might be made at 80,000 or so among the refugees and that this would be very roughly equivalent to those who were not completely sedentary.

Miscellaneous: Absent from our list in App. B. a small qabîlah of about 150 families, settled near Gaza, probably not refugees, called the Abû Suwîraḥ.

The census of 1946 showed a few families of nomads near Lake Huleh and a few more in the southtern Ghor but so far I have not been able to trace these. The only Nejeb tribes likely to have contained true nomads are the Saʿidiyyîn and the O'Heiwat (sic, Arabic spelling not known to writer) and most of these have probably wandered off to join their brethren in Sinai or Southern Jordan.

APPENDIX C

SOME SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The following list gives only a few of the possible sources, those that the writer has come across, and there is probably much more material available.

A. Printed.

G. W. Murray, Sons of Ishmael (a study of the Arab tribes of Egypt, including Sinai)
ʿArif Pasha al ʿArif, Al Qadâ: baîn al Badû, and Tharîkh bain al Badû wa al-qabâ:il , Jerusalem 1933 and 1934 respectively. (Now in possession of the Statistical Department of UNRWA.)
General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics of the Palestine Govt. years 1944-1946
Documents Submitted to the U.N. Committee of Enquiry
Documents submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry
Survey of Skilled Tradesmen, Secret Publication of Palestine Govt.
Census of Livestock in Palestine (Offprint from G.M. B. above will be lent to us)
"Census of Bedouin" by Sâmi Wafad ad-Dijâni, in Population Studies, London, 1947, first part. Ed. Dr. Glass, pub. London School of Economics.

An attempt will be made to obtain the above from London.

The bulk of the original data of surveys, much of which has not yet been published were left in Jreusalem and are presumably now in the hands of the Jews. It would be well worth trying to obtain access to them.

Census of the Villages in Palestine, 1946 (In hands of Stat. Dept.)

B. Persons

Sâmi Wafad ad-Dijâni , now in the Customs Department at Damascus. Extremely knowledgable, especially from the economic side, helpful.
ʿArif Pasha al ʿArif, now Mayor of Jerusalem. Helpful, and knowledgable but most of his information is published in the above books.
ʿAbdurrazzak al Qlaîbû , retired D.C. Gaza, now retired there. Very helpful but does not remember much now.
The paramount sheikhs of the tribes . At least in a preliminary enquiry they are likely to be very helpful as they are proud of their tribes. Liable to exaggerate numbers for reasons of prestige apart from any questions of rations.
The Palestinian personnel of UNRWA concerned with the census operations and also those concerned with administration of camps with many tribesmen.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/40

FROM
Sir J. Troutbeck
Bagdad.
To Mr Ross.

No. 1102/42/52.

Dated 26.5.52.

Received in Registry— 4.6.52.

Resettlement - Iraq.

Steps will be taken to encourage contractors to obtain labour from among the refugees.

(add. to Mr Furlonge, Amman of 19th May.)

References

-/21.

EQ1103/3.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 4/7

(Index)

MINUTES

Pl. ~~remind~~ Mr Myers, Beirut, regarding Mr Evans' letter of May 1st to Sir H. Knight on /21.

CW 11/6

BF 20/6.

CW 23/6.

~~BF 15/7~~

Now see /50.

CW 3/7

41070

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

1102/42/52.

19th May, 1952.

FE 1826/21

Thank you for your letter 11411/3 of 19th April about the employment of refugees in Iraq. You will since have seen from Bromley's letter 1822/36/52 of 23rd April to Evans in M.E.S (not copies to BMEO and Washington) that Nuri has confirmed our impression that the Iraqis would not object if contractors brought in refugees to do work for which they were unable to find Iraqi labour. I imagine there would be even less objection to bringing in people who are not strictly refugees but Jordan citizens by origin.

2. We will do what we can to encourage contractors to use Jordanians or Palestine refugees generally rather than other types of foreign labour, and I think any action which the Foreign Office can take in this direction would also be useful. But it is pretty certain that contractors will not want to go to the trouble of bringing in refugees from Jordan until such time as the labour supply in Iraq becomes really short and they are obliged to look elsewhere. We have incidentally noticed some confusion in the minds of contractors to whom we have already talked about this. They tend to assume that all Palestinians are Jews.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Ross (reference Middle East Secretariat letter EQ 1103/3 of the 26th April) and also to Rapp, Frank and Knight.

(Sgd) J. M. TROUTBECK

G.W.Furlonge Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
British Legation,
Amman.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

GERMANY SUPPLIES

E E 1826/41

FROM

Chancery, Damascus

Comm'd.

No. 18202/70/52.

Dated

Received in Registry— 30.5.52. 4.6.52.

Refugee Conference - Damascus.

Details of Toukan's talk with Brig. Silo. Discusses the reports on Toukan.

(Add. to Fayid)

Last Paper

References

-/33

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 10/6

(Index) 14/6

Next Paper

(Minutes.)

~~E. Dept.~~ PWR. 7/6

C Watalino 6/6

CW 4/6

34839

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Legation,
Damascus.

18202/70/52

30th May, 1952.

Dear Chancery,

Your letter 107/3/2 of the 12th May about a piece in the Egyptian Mail of the 10th May about Arab political groups meeting in Damascus to discuss re-settlement of refugees.

According to our information, which comes from an acquaintance of Toukan's, Brigadier Silo merely told Toukan that he was anxious to improve the lot of the refugees and would do what he considered to be in their interests without prejudicing their right to repatriation. This is a very different matter from approval by the Foreign Ministry of Syria.

We have no other information about this meeting and, from what we hear, Toukan himself is simply another unscrupulous Arab "leader" whose position depends to a large extent on his ability to keep the refugee problem unsettled.

We are sending copies of this letter to Eastern Department and to the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut and Cairo.

Yours ever,
CHANCERY.

Chancery,
British Middle East Office,
CAIRO.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/42

FROM

Sir H. Knight.
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry— 20. 5. 52. 4. 6. 52.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 30/6

(Index)

Refugees.

Encloses a note by Mr Keen, UNRWA on "some thoughts on the early solution of the Palestine refugee problem".

MINUTES

Mr. Keen's analysis of the present position is fair, though somewhat unnecessarily pessimistic. His proposal (the inclusion of the 'compensation' issue) does not really alter matters. The point is that resettlement has got to be 'sold' to the Syrians. Once this hurdle is overcome, the others can probably be negotiated.

Mr. Keen has been ill-advised to circulate this memo. without prior clearance with the Director.

Miss Vatiyeh 28/6

CW 30/6.

41070

Confidential

Personal

[redacted]

Enter

28.5.52.

E Q 1826/42

My dear Evans

Herewith a note of Keen,

which he has just given me,

I shd like to discuss in

London.

in gl. haste

[illegible]

HW [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

Some thoughts on an early solution of the Palestine refugee problem

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It is now 3½ years since the United Nations was given responsibility for the care and later the reintegration of the Palestine refugees. During this period slow but measurable progress has been achieved at a cost of approximately $100 million, largely expended on relief services which are becoming increasingly institutionalised and taken for granted by the refugee. It might be estimated that the transition envisaged by the present programme could be concluded in ten years at a total cost of $500 million.

An early solution of the problem of the relations between the Western World and the Middle East is clearly of prime importance. The Palestine refugee problem must be well on the way to settlement before this can be achieved but, paradoxically, it cannot really gather momentum except within the framework of basic political agreement.

Any assumption that a facile solution can be reached by resettling the refugees in Lebanon, Jordan or Gaza in their present location should be resisted; although the present $11 million programme in Jordan might resettle 5,000 families, whilst a vigorous ancillary programme of bi-lateral aid, including the Yarmuk scheme, might allow for the absorption of a maximum of 25,000 families, but their existence would remain precarious in bad years.

It is clear that Syria is the only place where substantial reintegration can take place within the time available. Apart from the disadvantages of a different cultural pattern and climate, it appears in any case that Iraq could not absorb additional man-power for another five to seven years, with the exception of certain skilled individuals whose removal only renders the reintegration of the mass the more difficult.

It is unlikely that the present offer to the Syrian Government will be accepted in its entirety and even if it were, it is doubtful if it could be implemented without the specific approval of the Governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt whose refugee population would have to be moved to Syria. Furthermore, although a Dictatorship has the advantage that it can more easily take definite decisions, it has the greater disadvantage that it must continually appear as the Saviour of its own people. It is therefore difficult to see that the Syrian Government could, at this time, accept substantial sums of money for the benefit of people other than Syrians. There is, therefore, the added risk that the present negotiations on $170 million for the reintegration of 125,000 families may, if they succeed, only lead in practice to the reintegration of the 16,000 refugee families already in Syria, with the balance of the money being diverted to general economic development.

2/..Examination

Examination would appear to show that the General Assembly estimates under the three-year programme are inadequate to provide for the reintegration of some 150,000 families, and this inadequacy becomes daily greater since a substantial portion of the amount available is being used up on direct relief, the Director has already estimated the delay to be the equivalent of six months. For instance estimates show that a house might cost $700; tools, equipment and seeds a further $400 which leaves an average of only $250 for the land including, it would seem, its purchase since it appears to be cheaper to buy private land which usually needs less development than to make the large investments necessary if donated state domain is to be developed for resettlement.

The following table shows that contributions so far pledged are far from adequate to meet even the sum which is at present being used as a basis for negotiations with the Syrian Government. Furthermore, it is extremely probable that this Government will demand a higher price per capita as well as supplementary international investment for the direct benefit of the Syrian people.

(in $ million)

	Fiscal 51/52	52/53	53/54	
G.A. Plan of Expenditure	77	118	55	- 250
Contributions pledged	67	79	say 55	- 201
Deficit	10	39	nil	- 49
Excess cost relief over Plan	-	5	5	- 10
Total Deficit over Plan	10	44	5	- 59
Planned available for Reintegration	50	100	50	- 200
Amount available for Reintegration	40	56	45	- 141

Amount available for Reintegration			141
Less	Administration (to June '54)	6.6	
	Capital Jordan Devel.Bank	1.0	
	Expenditure on minor projects to date	1.0	
	Minor reintegration projects and training in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Libya to June '54	3.0	
	Jordan programme	11.0	22.6
	Available for programme in Syria		119.4

Note:- Estimate includes U.K. Contribution Fiscal 52/53 rate Fiscal 51/52. No allowances made that U.S. Contribution not to exceed 70% of total

The debate in the General Assembly obtained no specific promises from the Arab Governments but committed the Western Powers to a substantial contribution to the three-year programme. Subsequent long and patient negotiations with the Arab Governments cannot yet be said to have produced a single specific promise on their part beyond vague re-affirmations, of their agreement with the principle of reintegration as a temporary solution of the Palestine refugee problem.

In view of the experience gained so far, and the practical difficulties of implementing a programme along the lines of current negotiation, it is for consideration whether reintegration under the present General Assembly Resolution can succeed, more especially as this leaves untouched the burning question of compensation or repatriation. The latter is obviously impracticable on any large scale since it would only throw up another refugee problem; Israel's present population is clearly in excess of its absorptive capacity within the immediate future. Compensation has been assessed at $300 million, a figure which is regarded as pitifully adequate by the Arabs. The cost of the UNRWA programme is estimated at $250 million and is likely, if pursued, to cost twice that sum. Would it not therefore be better to face the issue and to combine both elements which are essential to a final settlement. The Western Powers would then offer, through the United Nations, a global sum not for allegedly temporary homes and jobs, but for final payment to the Arabs of the compensation envisaged in the United Nations Resolution of 11 December 1948. This might amount to $400 million payable over five to seven years under conditions which would appeal to the public and private cupidity of the highly individualistic Arab; perhaps along the following lines:

1. $75 million to be divided between the four Arab Governments in the proportion in which their countries at present harbour refugees. Against this payment, the Arab Governments would be required to undertake to provide relief for as long as necessary, under United Nations inspection, and to agree to allow the refugees to leave in groups as and when requested by the United Nations.

2. $125 million to the Government of Syria upon their undertaking to develop lands and industry in Syria which would provide economic opportunity for 125,000 families and to permit the entry of refugee families to make up this number, upon United Nations request.

3. $25 million to the Government of Jordan, upon similar terms, to cover 25,000 families.

4. $75 million for payment in local currency of the equivalent of $100 to each Arab refugee upon his reaching an Arab country where he would agree to resettle and to be removed from the relief rolls.

5. $100 million to be divided between Arabs having claims for compensation for fixed assets and property left in Israel, the higher claims being heavily scaled down.

4/... It would

It would, however, appear essential that these proposals should be publicly debated by the United Nations and incorporated in specific terms in the General Assembly Resolution. United Nations participation, effected through a new Agency, should be limited to cooperative planning, observation and inspection of results, financial control of expenditure, technical assistance and advice on economic development.

There would also need to be an active programme of uni-lateral and bi-lateral aid for the economic development of the Arab countries since this alone can provide conditions which make resettlement viable and also take care of the movement or resettlement of approximately 25,000 families of economic refugees. Particular attention would have to be given to industrial development and the need for a balanced economy. This aid would be channelled through the various participating Agencies but would be coordinated by an Advisory Commission serviced by the Secretariat of the United Nations Development Board or, later, the Economic Commission for the Middle East. Membership would initially be the same as the present UNRWA Advisory Commission, but as the programme developed all countries within the area would be invited to participate.

The present plan, based on point by point negotiation in friendly cooperation with the Arab Governments, will inevitably be far more costly and less satisfactory in its results than a solution along the lines suggested above. Furthermore, it would leave untouched the burning question of compensation whose settlement is an essential requisite to peace and stability in the Middle East.

JK.
Beirut
28th May, 1952

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/43

FROM

Mr H. Knight
Beirut
To Mr Evans.

No. Secret AC. 35.

Dated

Received in Registry— 28.5.52. 4.6.52

Cessation of relief – Israel.

Transmits a proposal (No 37) for AdCom consideration that Israel should resume responsibility for the remaining 20,000 refugees on UNRWA ration lists

References

EE1826/41/51

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) [signature] 11/9

(Index) [signature] 10/10

MINUTES

This decision of the Israeli Government is generally satisfactory. In view of Israel's general record in her treatment of her Arab minority, it would, however, I suggest, be desirable that the U.N. should find some way of keeping an eye on what happens to the 20,000 refugees in question after the hand-over. I should therefore be grateful for your comments on the point raised in the last paragraph of Mr Blandford's paper. His suggestion that UNRWA ~~C Watkins~~ ~~Mr Pullar~~ might maintain a ~~E Dept~~ foothold through having a small technical assistance office seems to me quite a good one.

9/6.

C Watkins
9/6

Mr Pullar
E Dept

If the 20,000 are going to be completely integrated into the community I do not think there would be much to be gained by having any UNRWA office left, unless the Israel Government specifically asked for it. The refugees would cease to be such, and become absorbed (or not) like the other Arabs. H A Pullar 19/6

Mr Wardrop.

I

41070

I agree with Mr Pullen. No special arrangements of this kind seem to have been made in the case of the 28000 apparently already absorbed, so why make any for the last 20000? Are they different in any way from their predecessors?

James C Wardrop
10/6

Mr Waterlow again.

I am not so sure. In the present stage of its negotiations with Arab Govts, particularly Syria, the agency will have to be very careful about not giving the impression that they are "abandoning" the Arab refugees in Israel.

[signature] 18/6

Sir H Knight (for obs)

CW 8/8

NW sec/52

B.F. 25/6.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Ad. C. 240

AC35.

Eng. Copy No. 11

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 37

27 May 1952

Subject: Cessation of Relief in Israel

Attached is a copy of a letter received from the Israeli Government responsive to our repeated suggestion, starting last September, that Israel assume responsibility for the remaining 20,000 refugees on UNRWA ration lists.

A conference was held on May 26 with the Prime Minister, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dr. Comay. Principally the discussion turned on the question as to time of take-over. The Israeli Government had in mind a date of approximately September 1 on the premise that some months were needed for the Government to organize for this task. There is an impression that the cooperation of several ministries will be required. I urged strongly that the date be July 1 in order that our report for the current fiscal year might record the fact of turn-over and that we might reduce the drain on our small relief fund to the minimum. I advised the Government that there would be possibly two months of food supply in the pipeline, and suggested they might take over intact, with the exception of the international personnel, the present organization and carry on under the present system while they were studying new arrangements involving various ministries. This suggestion they promised carefully to consider in a meeting next week and hoped to be able to accept the July 1 date. In any event, the Government very much desired that the Agency's report include a reference to a conclusive arrangement as to the turn-over of relief.

It is further the Government's wish that there be a clear-cut severance of our relationship, in the belief that only confusion could result if we remained in the field as a point of appeal. I am inclined to think that the reason is sound and that once the Government has taken responsibility, our position might become ineffective and perhaps quite awkward. As a matter of fact, I believe that the broad question of refugee rights and status under such circumstances would technically fall within the frame of reference of the PCC. There is a small question as to whether there should remain a relationship and, conceivably, a small office of a different type in the general field of technical assistance.

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB:ep

346

Distribution:

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VERY CONFIDENTIAL

18th May, 1952

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I refer to the correspondence between Dr. Meron and yourself in October and November of last year, arising out of your proposal that UNRWA should be relieved of further responsibility for Palestinian refugees in Israel, and I am now glad to be able to convey to you the agreement of the Israel Government to this proposal.

The number of registered Palestinian refugees in Israel was originally some 48,000, and they have been reduced to the present figure of approximately 20,000 through a process of permanently absorbing refugees into the Israel economy. Those who have continued to receive UNRWA rations have at the same time been provided by the Israel authorities with the same social services as are available to other inhabitants of the State, and it is computed that the cost to the Israel Government of health, education, welfare, religious, agricultural and other services, for the Arab Palestinian refugees in Israel, during the years 1950 and 1951, amounted to about one and a quarter million dollars. The cessation of UNRWA's present activities in Israel would throw a substantial additional burden on the Government, particularly as up to half the remaining refugees are social cases who are not expected to become self-supporting and will remain a permanent charge on the community.

It will be recalled that in previous discussions we had with General Kennedy and Mr. Keen, it was suggested that UNRWA should make a financial contribution to this burden, either in the form of a per capita subsidy for the feeding of refugees in respect of whom the Israel Government would have taken over administrative responsibility, or alternatively, in the form of an ad hoc grant of over a million dollars towards the cost of their permanent resettlement. It is our understanding that such suggestions are no longer being considered, and that as from the date on which UNRWA ceases to operate in Israel, it will have no further responsibility, financial or otherwise, for the Palestinian refugees who are at present still registered with UNRWA.

The Government contemplates that there will then cease to exist in Israel a distinct category of "Palestinian refugees", with a status which differs from that of other inhabitants of the country. It is the Government's intention to make provision for the individuals and families concerned within the context of general settlement schemes and existing welfare services, and such arrangements are now under discussion.

We would welcome an opportunity to consult you about the date on which it would be appropriate for UNRWA to terminate its activities here, and I am indeed pleased to hear that you intend visiting Israel shortly.

Yours sincerely,

M. S. Comay

The Hon. John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director General of UNRWA,
Beirut, Syria.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1826/44

FROM

Mr Myers
Beirut
W M Evans.

No. 9 H M/W/1

Dated

Received in Registry— 6. 6. 52
11. 6. 52

Resettlement of refugee tribesmen.

Record of his visit to Jordan
& his talks with Glubb Pasha.

Last Paper

(Minutes.)

Draft letter to Mr Myers. E W. 14/7

References

—/39

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft to Myers, Beirut, from Miss Waterlow 15 July.

(Action completed)	(Index)
8/14/7.	

Next Paper

OHM/N/1

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

6th June, 1952.

E 1826/44

Dear Evans,

Please refer to my letter OHM/M/1 of the 30th May regarding refugee tribesmen.

2. The results of my visit to Jordan are much more promising than I hoped. I had a long talk with Glubb Pasha, who was enthusiastic about the project and offered to collaborate fully in every way, starting by lending us two of his best Bedouin officers to help in carrying out a survey of the 50,000 tribesmen refugees in Jordan on rations or half rations, together with those who claim to be refugees and are not on the rations. Glubb stated that he knew personally families who were quite definitely refugees from Israel but who were not on our ration lists possibly because they were driven out at a relatively recent date, and that these people were really in a desperate state. In many cases their children were already all dead, while in others they were as thin as sticks, and he made it clear that he would only co-operate if we would agree to deal with all the genuine tribal refugees from Israel. Blandford agreed to this proposition provided, of course, that the survey did not produce an unreasonable number of new families.

3. In Glubb's view, the nomadic family could be taken off the rations and started in life again with 10 or 12 sheep as opposed to the 30-50 that I estimated, though he agreed that this was, of course, a very bare minimum. On this point I am a little doubtful whether UNRWA refugees on full rations would leave them for such a small outfit, but should this be found to be so, money will nevertheless be available from the Jordan re-integration budget to give them a better start.

4. In Glubb's view they could be started off without making any special arrangements about grazing rights with the paramount Sheikhs, as these are used to tribes coming into their area from the centre of Saudi Arabia. I am not sure, however, that the Lands Department of Jordan will agree, and this will have to be discussed with Walpole.

5. Accompanying the programme of setting up the refugees themselves there would have to be some plan for range improvement and I have discussed this with Dayoe of F.A.O. Syria and Molohan of Point Four in Jordan, and the latter is very willing that whatever we do should be linked with their own programme for the same subject.

6. Blandford has at last agreed that Marsack can do this job provided that Glubb clears him with the Jordanian Government, and this Glubb has promised to do.

7. I was also able to arrange a meeting between Glubb, Blandford and Conrad which should, I think, be fruitful as up to the present Glubb is convinced that the Agency does not want to co-operate with the Jordan Government, and I am sure that Blandford and Conrad will be able to dispose of this view.

8. Until the survey has been done, it is impossible to estimate how many of the tribesmen are still sufficiently

/nomadic

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

nomadic and good at shepherding to fall within this project, but I will write further on the matter later.

9. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and to Amman.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

39 ~~14~~/7

EE 1826/44

OUTFILE

To get tomorrow's Gay 14/5

Draft letter to O.H. Myers Esq Beirut from CWaterton.

As you know, Trevor Evans left the Secretariat at the end of June, & I am ~~afraid~~ sorry that, owing to pressure of work due to his departure & the Ambassadors' Conference, I have ~~failed~~ not answered your letter OHM/N/1 of June 6th about resettlement of refugee Tilesmen sooner.

I have read your paper, & your letter to James Keen, with the greatest interest. The prospect of ~~settling~~ rehabilitating nearly 150,000 people quite quickly & at (presumably) relatively very small cost, is obviously one of which the fullest advantage should be taken. I am very glad that BMEO are able to help & I hope that you will let me know if there is anything that we can do from this end. In 1944, when the idea of a water holes programme for promoting grazing in Jordan was first ~~suggested~~ proposed, it was suggested that the Sudan might be able to provide expert advice. Presumably, however, Point IV now have this matter well in hand.

estimated that the sheep population of Jordan could thereby be doubled, and it was

You may, if you think it would help, inform Mr Blandford & the Advisory Commission that the Foreign Office attach importance to these ~~programme~~ plans being pressed ahead as rapidly as possible. It is a great pity that your

(Sir H. Knight ~~to~~ agrees.)

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
14 JUL 1952
SENT TO TYPE 14/7.
DESPATCHES

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

paper did not reach us last year. I am now having it copied & will return the original by next week's Bag.

Since drafting the above, I have received your letter AC of July 4th. It is very disappointing to hear of the new opposition to ~~your~~ the proposal. You may care to discuss it with Mr Furlonge, who has now returned to Amman, ~~&~~ ~~with~~ Bill Crawford, ~~to~~ will also presumably do what he can to get it moving.

CW 14/7

(40237) Wt.46454/204 55,000 3/50 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(EE 1826/44) OUTFILE FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

UNCLASSIFIED 15th July, 1952.

Dear Mr Myers

As you know, Trevor Evans left the Secretariat at the end of June, and I am sorry that, owing to pressure of work due to his departure to the Ambassadors' Conference, I have not answered your letter (OHM/N/1 of the 6th June about resettlement of refugee Tribesmen sooner.

I have read your paper and your letter to James Keen, with the greatest interest. The prospect of rehabilitating nearly 150,000 people quite quickly and at (presumably) relatively very small cost, is obviously one of which the fullest advantage shall be taken. I am very glad that British Middle East Office are able to help and I hope that you will let me know if there is anything that we can do from this end. In 1949, when the idea of a water holes programme for promoting grazing in Jordan was first proposed, it was estimated that the sheep population of Jordan could thereby be doubled, and it was suggested that the Sudan might be able to provide expert advice. Presumably, however, Point IV now have this matter in hand.

You may, if you think it would help, inform Mr. Blandford and the Advisory Commission that the Foreign Office attach importance to these plans being pushed ahead as rapidly as possible. (Sir Henry Knight agrees). It is a great pity that your paper did not reach us last year. I am now having it copied and will return the original by next week's Bag.

Since drafting the above, I have received your letter AC of the 4th July. It is very disappointing to hear of the new opposition to the proposal. You may care to discuss it with Mr. Furlonge, who has now returned to Amman, Bill Crawford will also presumably do what he can to get it moving.

(C. Waterlow)(Miss)

O.H. Myers, Esq.,
Beirut.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/45

FROM

Mr Myers, Beirut to Mr Evans.

No. AC.218.

Dated 12.6.52.

Received in Registry— 18.6.52.

Jordan Valley.

Mr Locke proposed at the last Adcom meeting that a desk survey should be made of the entire Jordan Valley problem.

Discusses.

Last Paper

References

/22.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dfd Mr Myers, Beirut for Miss Waterlow July.

(Action completed) [signature] 2/7

(Index) [signature]

Next Paper

(MINUTES)

I am sorry to have held this up, for pp.

Shall we not draw Mr Myers' attention to our tel No. 338 of May 1st (see 122)? We might discuss with Sir H. Knight & Sir T. Rapp.

C. Waterlow 25/6.

Provided it is a "desk survey" & that there is no publicity (& this means that a visit to the area will either have to be abandoned or very carefully timed in the not very near future), no harm will be done.

I will discuss with Sir T Rapp. The matter should, I think, be mentioned to Mr Blandford on Friday

[signature] 25/6

Sir T. Rapp agrees. We should inform Mr Myers. We had

38074

no opportunity of making this point
with Mr Bland for.
Miss Waterlow. [illegible] 20/6

Letter to Mr Myers. EW 1/7

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

(AC 218)

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

12th June, 1952.

E 1826/45

Dear Evans,

At the last Adcom. meeting, Locke proposed that a desk survey should be made of the entire Jordan Valley problem. He explained that by this he meant simply a survey of all the available information to be carried out in New York, London or Paris, with at the most a short visit to this part of the world.

2. He suggested that UNRWA should be responsible for this and that it should be done with a minimum of stir and publicity. It appears that General Riley would have to apply to the United Nations for special funds to do it which would draw attention to the matter while Technical Assistance work is very much in the public eye. At the same time Locke considers that it would be better done by a multi-lateral rather than a bi-lateral agency.

3. He suggested that it should be done by a small team containing a top-notch international lawyer and first-class engineering talent, either individuals or a firm, and stated that staff of T.V.A. could be used.

4. The investigation would be purely technical and fact-finding and there would be no question of negotiating with Governments or getting involved in the present political situation.

5. There was a misunderstanding at the meeting as I and some others thought this was a preliminary suggestion for later consideration, and Bergus, Locke and the Director all thought that it had been approved. I wrote a letter to you asking for your views on the matter, while the American Delegation wrote to Washington and London (where they will doubtless get into touch with you) saying that it had been approved.

6. The only score on which I had any doubt was that of the size of the project and Bergus assured me last night that they did not envisage more than two people, the lawyer and the engineer, and that the whole thing should not cost more than about $5,000. I said that on these grounds I concurred with the idea and would write to you to inform you.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

EE 1826/45.
CONFIDENTIAL.

OUTFILE

Middle East Secretariat,

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

1st July, 1952.

Your letter AC 218 of the 12th June about Mr Locke's proposal for a survey of the Jordan Valley Waters problem.

2. As you will have seen from our telegram No. 353 of the 1st May, we do not think that it would be advisable for U.N.R.W.A. to take the initiative in arranging for a formal study of the Jordan Valley to be undertaken. Provided, however, that the investigation proposed by Mr Locke is essentially a "desk survey" and that there is no publicity (and this means that the experts concerned, if they visit the area at all, should time their visit very carefully and not make it in the near future), no harm will be done.

3. The above has been discussed with Sir Thomas Rapp, who agrees.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter and of yours, to the Chanceries at Washington, Amman, Damascus and Telaviv.

O.H.Myers, Esq.,
British Legation,
Beirut.

(C. Waterlow.)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/46

FROM

F.O. Minute
(Miss Waterlow)

No.

Dated 19.6.52.

Received in Registry— 20.6.52.

Mr Blandford's meeting with British consultants & contractors.

Discusses the various matters e.g. irrigation & housing schemes, in which Mr Blandford will be interested.

References

MINUTES

CW 26/6.

See with.

A) Secy, Export Group for Constructional Industries to Miss Waterlow 23/6

EW 28/6.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

A) Mr Holloway, from Miss Waterlow. 19 June.

(Action completed)	(Index)
20/6	

40673

(Miss Waterlow.)

Registry No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

J.Holloway, Esq.,
Secretary,
Export Group for the Constructional Industries,
82, New Cavendish Street,
W. 1.

FROM :
Miss Waterlow.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 11647/234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-3078

E Q1826/46

Ente

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

OUTFILE

June, 1952.

As explained on the telephone, Mr J. Blandford, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees, is arriving in this country on the 26th June for a three-day visit. One of the purposes of his visit is to make contact with British consultants and contractors with a view to possible contracts in connexion with ~~the~~ irrigation and housing schemes. The latter would probably be carried out with local raw materials - mud, brick or stone - but it is possible that, for the sake of speed, Mr Blandford might be interested also in inexpensive concrete houses.

2. The Board of Trade have suggested that the best way of arranging for Mr Blandford to make appropriate contacts would be through the Export Group for the Constructional Industries. We are therefore very glad that you will be prepared to see Mr Blandford and possibly to arrange for your Group to give him luncheon on the 27th June.

3. I should add that Her Majesty's Government, who have made a substantial financial contribution to the Agency, and are represented on its Advisory Commission, attach~~ed~~ the greatest importance to its success in the vital task of resettling the 850,000 refugees. We also consider that this task could probably be most effectively carried out through the employment of suitable British and other firms of

/contractors .....

contractors to undertake the major capital works involved. We have therefore greatly welcomed Mr Blandford's initiative in ~~wishing~~ deciding to approach British firms and we hope that your Group will be able to give him an encouraging response.

4. In case it may be of use, I attach a memorandum describing the general background of the Agency's work.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
20 JUN 1952
SENT TO DEPT.

Enc 4/6.

(C. Waterlow.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

Middle East Secretariat,

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

19th June, 1952.

As explained on the telephone, Mr J. Blandford, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, is arriving in this country on the 26th June for a three-day visit. One of the purposes of his visit is to make contact with British consultants and contractors with a view to possible contracts in connexion with irrigation and housing schemes. The latter would probably be carried out with local raw materials - mud, brick or stone - but it is possible that, for the sake of speed, Mr Blandford might be interested also in inexpensive concrete houses.

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4. In case it may be of use, I attach a memorandum describing the general background of the Agency's work.

J. Holloway, Esq.,
Secretary,
Export Group for the
Constructional Industries,
82, New Cavendish Street, W.1.

(C.Waterlow.)

Trevor

The Export Group for the Constructional Industries.

SECRETARY
HOWARD A. CLOSE, M.A. (CANTAB.)

PHONE
LANGHAM 4041-2-3

EXPORT GROUP
CONSTRUCTIONAL INDUSTRIES

82, NEW CAVENDISH STREET,
LONDON, W.1.

HAC/GP/E.101.

23rd June, 1952.

INDEXED
E1826/46 A)

Miss C. Waterlow,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

Dear Miss Waterlow,

I thank you for your letter of the 19th instant and refer to our telephone conversation this afternoon. This Group is pleased to entertain Mr. J. Blandford with Mr. T.E.Evans, O.B.E., at the Dorchester Hotel on Friday next, 27th June at 12.45 for 1.0 p.m.

My Chairman has asked me to extend invitations to some ten members of this Group who would be interested to hear what Mr. Blandford has to say. Perhaps you would be so good as to confirm the acceptance of this invitation.

Yours sincerely,

Howard A. Close

Secretary.

Confirmed.
Aw 26/6.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/47

FROM

Mr Bromley, Bagdad.

to MCS

No. 1822/52/52.

Dated 18. 6. 52.

Received in Registry— 23. 6. 52.

Resettlement in Iraq.

During Mr Blandford's visit to Iraq he discussed with Nuri Pasha, the settling of skilled & semi-skilled refugees in Iraq

References

-/21
40

MINUTES

This seems satisfactory.

PWT. 28/6

E Dept (Mr Rhyfelen)

EWaterlow 26/6

27/6

EW 3/7.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

41070

E

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Embassy,

BAGDAD.

1822/52/52.

18th June, 1952.

E E 1826/21

E 1826/47

Dear Secretariat,

Please refer to my letter to T.E.Evans 1822/36/52 of the 23rd April about the problem of Palestine refugees.

2. Blandford visited Iraq for a few days at the beginning of June.

3. He called on the Ambassador and told him of his hopes of settling about a hundred thousand refugees permanently in Jordan and five hundred thousand in Syria. He agreed with the Ambassador that the Syrians might perhaps be more ready to go forward with these schemes if they could feel assurance that they would not be pilloried for doing so in the other Arab states. As to this, he took some comfort from the fact that Dr. Fadl Jamali, whom he had seen a few hours before, had welcomed U.N.W.R.A's plans for Syria.

4. Blandford saw the Prime Minister before he left, and, according to Count Knuth, he had a satisfactory interview. He did not go into details about his plans in Syria, but he mentioned them and the Yusuf Pasha dam and Nuri raised no objection. (He told Dorsey Stevens of the International Bank at about the same time that Iraq would be willing to negotiate an agreement on the use of the Euphrates waters at a technical level.)

5. So far as Iraq was concerned, Nuri agreed that contractors and others could bring in refugees to do skilled and semi-skilled work for which Iraqis were not available, and he said he realized that there would very soon be a shortage of such people for development work in Iraq. He also agreed that individual refugees trained by U.N.W.R.A. in technical work (e.g. mechanics and medical orderlies) could be admitted to Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of Health have already agreed to take about 100 orderlies and sanitary staff.

6. U.N.W.R.A. have a scheme for establishing refugees in small industries here, e.g. as tailors or electricians. U.N.W.R.A. would provide the

/money

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

money which would be loaned through the Iraqi Industrial Bank. Nuri did not object to this, and Count Knuth is going to negotiate the details with the Industrial Bank when he returns from leave in the autumn.

7. Blandford did not discuss the question of settlement of refugees on the land while he was here.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Amman, Damascus and Washington, and to the Development Division of B.M.E.O. at Beirut.

Yours ever,

T E Bromley

(T.E.Bromley).

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/48

FROM

Mr Anderson,
U.K. Del, N. York.
to Mr Evans.

No. 1827/76/52E.

Dated

Received in Registry— 20. 6. 52.
24. 6. 52

Resettlement.

During a lunch given to the Negotiating Committee, Mr Blandford made a short progress report on resettlement + development.

References

E1829/31
27
23

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 25/6

(Index)

MINUTES

Mr Blandford has jumped his guns somewhat in saying that agreement with Syria has been reached. News of this has now leaked into the headlines of the Jewish press.

? Copy to Treasury.

C Watkins
26/6.

Mr. Blandford explained fully what was involved in the agreement with Syria at yesterday's meeting at which the Treasury were represented. No need to copy to Tsy.

[illegible] 28/6

41070

E 1826/48 to enter

E

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION to the
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

NO. 1824/76/52E

20th June, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Evans,

EE1829/23

Foreign Office telegram No. 2544 Saving to Washington, paragraph 5, suggested we might have comments on the timing of the announcement of the United Kingdom contribution to U.N.R.W.A. I consulted Greenhill by telephone and concurred in Washington telegram No. 633(6) of the 11th June. In compliance with Foreign Office telegram No. 460 of the 14th June to BEIRUT we will not say anything here about it until further notice.

EE1829/30
EE1829/27

2. Blandford gave a lunch to the members of the Negotiating Committee on the 18th June. This enabled him to make a short off the record progress report, and to answer questions without going through the formality of an official meeting. He said that, although this should not be publicised, agreement with Syria had been reached and that he was in consultation with the Governments of Iraq and Jordan for the permanent settlement of refugees in those two territories also. For economic and political reasons the Governments of Egypt and Lebanon were not themselves able to absorb refugees, but they had supported him in his negotiations with the Government of Syria.

3. Blandford asked the Committee to avoid the use of such terms as "integration" and "resettlement" which are tricky because they have become charged with emotional and political meanings. The Agency's main tasks were to create such conditions of economic development in the area that governments would require additional manpower, and to train the refugees so that they would be capable of filling this need, thereby becoming welcome immigrants.

4. He also gave a certain amount of information about the proposed vocational training schemes.

5. Mr. Blandford's statement was very well received and created the impression that there was a good prospect of the programme bearing fruit. In addition to the United Kingdom, United States and France, Canada, Colombia, Lebanon and Pakistan are members of the Committee and a few senior members of the United Nations Secretariat were also present.

6. In reply to a question about the relief programme, Blandford explained that the target figure of $18 million for relief over the first annual period had proved too small. He hoped there might be agreement to spend as much as $24 million on relief, He also urged the principal contributing countries to make their payments generously and soon since these were essential to initial success. Once there was tangible proof of the success of the programme he was confident that it would become easier to obtain the balance of contributions from other countries (with which the Negotiating Committee is mainly concerned).

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ronald Bailey, at Washington.

Yours ever
Martin

(C.M. Anderson)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/49

FROM

Mr Lyers, Beirut

~~To~~ Mr Evans.

No. Ottm/N/1.

Dated

Received in Registry— 19.6.52. 25.6.52.

Resettlement of nomads.

Transmits copy of a letter to Mr Keen of 14 June, giving a detailed plan for the "nomadic" resettlement programme.

References

-/44

139.

MINUTES

See 144. EW 14/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)

HES

(Action completed)	(Index)
29/7	10/10

40673

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

OHM/N/1

CONFIDENTIAL

14th June, 1952.

Dear Keen,

Here are some suggestions about the nomadic "resettlement" programme. I fully realise that once it starts the persons responsible will find that all sorts of changes are necessary in the procedure here suggested, but, having given the subject thought for some time, it seems possible that these ideas may prove a useful point of departure. The Director specifically asked me if I would keep in touch with the work, which I will gladly do, and I hope that I may be informed of progress; at the same time I have no desire to "back-seat drive". It would, I think, be helpful if we could go down together and see the parturition through.

2. A. Basic Information

(i) The Statistics Department at H.Q. and at Amman is in possession of some useful information, particularly 'Arif Pasha al 'Arif's two books on the Bedouin of Beer Sheba, the Government (Mandatory) Survey of the Villages of Palestine, Extracts from the Government Survey of Livestock, which they have taken from a book I lent to them, and some statistical material from London. I am sure that the Count de Briey will willingly hand these over as the first suggestion for an attack on this problem came from him. M. Ravet, at my request, wired yesterday to UNESCO in Paris to obtain for us two books dealing with the Bedouin of East and of North Palestine which should fill the biggest lacuna in our knowledge and the most important from the point of view of the tribesmen in Jordan.

(ii) I suggest that for any investigation to be successful, the investigators should have with them on cards, say one card for each 'Ashirah, a complete list of the divisions and sub-divisions together with basic information such as their ranging area in mandatory times and their degree of sedentarisation. Such cards could be compiled largely from the works mentioned, together with enquiries from paramount Sheikhs and Sheikhs.

B. The Survey

(i) This will be a difficult and fundamental operation and will require a "high-power" team. Glubb Pasha suggested to me two of his Bedouin officers; to Blandford two to four N.C.Os. I hope that

/he

James Keen, Esq.,
U.N.R.W.A.,
Beirut.

he may be persuaded to supply at least one officer and I understand from Marsack that there is one who has worked with Marsack before and whom Marsack considers to be extremely loyal and reliable.

(ii) The Survey will have to be tied in with UNRWA's registers as, after all, the main objective is to remove an adequate number of ration recipients from the lists. It will therefore have to include a new census in which our registration officers should be instructed to take part, and in which the aid of the Arab Legion will also be necessary. All the registration officers who know anything about the tribes have been moved to other work and, if humanly possible, one at least should be returned for this operation; the following are the three in order of preference - Shuhaiba, Ansari, and Duzdar. (Shuhaiba's paper on the Sinai tribes, with map, which I added to my first paper on the tribes, should be given to Marsack.)

(iii) The Survey should obtain, as well as the tribal details and original home of our ration recipients and those whom are thought to be exiles from Israel but are not on our lists, information as to whether

(a) they were tent-dwellers;

(b) they still own a tent;

(c) this is serviceable;

(d) they still own stock, of what sort, and how many (very difficult as they will probably leave the animals in charge of friends);

(e) they were shepherds; and

(f) they were camel or donkeymen.

(iv) At Appendix A is a tentative suggestion for a rubber stamp to use on the backs of the cards and to replace the heading "Occupation" on the standard Investigation Fact Sheet.

(v) If a tribe be divided between Gaza and Jordan, should we consider bringing the Gaza part over?

C. Family Equipment

(i) Fairly early during the survey it will be necessary to establish for once and all what offer is to be made to each family to get it started. We should not, as Glubb Pasha points out, have to lower this at any time through setting our sights too high, but it is equally important that we should not have to raise it through setting them so low that we get negligible acceptances. It is true that the lower it is, the less the operation will cost, but then we shall probably find fairly heavy acceptances from those not on rations and very few from among ration recipients. The offer needs, therefore, to be nicely balanced. Glubb Pasha considers that 10-12 sheep and a couple of donkeys would be

/sufficient.

sufficient. Mr. Eagan, livestock adviser to B.M.E.O., also considers 10-15 sheep and 2 donkeys plus a few chickens adequate. I fear that this will not prove very alluring as I doubt whether it would bring in a yield comparable to UNRWA rations, tent renewal from time to time and other amenities provided by us. An important part of the study must be to discover the economics of sheep farming in Jordan. I attach at Appendix B figures given me for Syria and some estimates from various sources.

(ii) I feel that it would be a help to give one or two months' rations to the families when setting off, unless work is provided on range improvement as suggested in E (iv) below.

(iii) It may be necessary to consider giving superior outfits to the important tribal sheikhs.

(iv) Each family should, in my opinion, be given some sort of card making it clear that they have not signed away any rights to lands or repatriation that they may have, as well as acting as an identification. (It should be impressive-looking.)

(v) If the number of families is not large, both sheep and camels could be bought locally; if it is large, sheep might have to come from Iraq and camels from Iraq or Sa'udi Arabia. A 20% increase in stock is reported from the Aleppo area, however. (I do not know the best market for donkeys.) I understand that at present the Iraqi sheep are grazing in Persia and will not return till October. They would thus have to be transported in lorries, partly to get them there in time for the beginning of the grazing season and partly because this would almost certainly be cheaper than the losses that would be incurred if they came on the hoof. Two-year-olds will be required and vetting, possibly by Bedu, will be necessary.

(vi) I have put out an enquiry about the prices of other items of equipment that might be needed at Aleppo, but investigations should be made at other places. If large numbers are required purchases will need to be separated in all four dimensions of the space-time continuum to avoid an astronomic rise in prices. It might perhaps pay to make use of Shibly Bishara (with due precautions) for this operation and that of stock purchase.

D. Grazing Rights

Glubb is of the opinion that it is not necessary to make any special arrangements about these, nor to bribe the Paramount Sheikhs of either the Transjordan tribes or the Palestinian tribes as they are used to invasions, there being one at present from Sa'udi Arabia. However, there is the point that our people would be permanent and not temporary invaders, and it has also been suggested to me that the Lands Department might have something to say on the matter. I have therefore written to Glubb asking him if he thinks it would be a good idea to call Walpole in on this.

/E.

E. Range Improvement

(i) In the interests of our tribesmen, the host tribes and the economy of Jordan, as well as to facilitate the acceptance of our plans, a programme of range improvement seems essential. It should go into operation so as to produce results the first season that our people are on the ranges (1952-53), but the fact must be faced that if there is a drought it may be a failure the first year. This, I think, is an inevitable hazard when working on the outer margin of rain-fed areas in the arid zones.

(ii) Since Point IV is carrying out just such a programme on an experimental and demonstrational scale, it would be folly not to take advantage of this and work with them. Mr. Molohon is very willing that this should be so and Mr. Locke approves fully of such a co-operative effort. This requires co-operative planning with Point IV from the beginning of the operation.

(iii) It will also require all the talent that can be brought to bear. M. Delbès is at present writing a chapter on the subject of nomadic economy in his report to the Arid Zones branch of UNESCO and his help should be made use of. M. Leroy might also have something to contribute and I will willingly ask for the help of Mr. Eagan (B.M.E.O.) on the livestock side. Arrangements have been started for Mr. Dayoe of F.A.O. to go to Casablanca in late July or early August to inspect M. Harlé's new drought-resistant pastures, and I suggest that if these fail, either Leroy or Delbès should go in his place.

(iv) The Point IV Plan is to set up demonstrations of water-spreading for which, in Molohon's opinion, much of the Jordan grazing land is ideal. He will be using machinery to get quick results, but feels that demonstrations of doing this work by man and animal power would be most valuable. We could give the selected families this job and let them earn some wages either additional to, or in lieu of, extra rations.

(v) F.A.O. and Point IV wish to experiment further before doing any artificial seeding of the ranges but for our purposes seeding seems necessary to get additional pasture in the first year. Seeding might be done both on the areas where water-spreading has been tried and on others. In Appendix C are a few preliminary notes on likely plants. Mr. de Fellner of R.W. Gunson of London, which has branches in South Africa and Australia, called on me in Damascus and he is visiting Molohon in Amman. He is writing now to discover availability and prices of seeds.

(vi) Hay-making demonstrations were suggested by Dr. Molohon who pointed out that millions of tons of hay were going to waste in Jordan this year. This would be most valuable. In a good winter the sheep starve in the higher areas where snow lies during the winter, and in a bad winter they

/survive

survive the winter only to die in the summer. Obviously there is room for improvement in this type of economy.

(vii) Requirement, in addition to seed, for this programme should be early discussed. Jeeps, spring-tooth harrows, rakes, tedders(?), mowers. Draught animals.

(viii) For range improvement to be effective, especially when using annual grasses, range control is essential and Glubb Pasha has stated that he can and will arrange this in connection with the programme.

F. Other Incentives for the Jordanians

Additional ways in which the Bedu might be helped if enough accepted resettlement to justify it would be sheep dips, a travelling veterinary service, a peripatetic school. Glubb feels, and I agree, that these should not be, as it were, imposed, but given only where there is some demand or a demand can be created.

G. Tribesmen Elsewhere

We should not lose sight of the fact that there are large numbers of tribesmen elsewhere, particularly in Gaza, where the records are rather more satisfactory than anywhere else. The possibility has already been suggested above that we might, perhaps, join up some people in Gaza with those in Jordan. It has been alleged that large numbers of Sinai Bedu are on our ration list in Gaza; this can only be checked by proper tribal registration. Further, there were some tribes that lived astride the old border. Maybe the Egyptians would agree to accept the Palestinian cousins if these were properly set up. Unfortunately of these tribes it appears that in all cases except one the bulk of the tribe was in Palestine and a smaller offshoot in Sinai. The exception is the Laheiwat, "that enterprising and ferocious people", and it might be worth enquiring if we have any on the ration list at Gaza. (Vide G.W. Murray, "Sons of Ishmael", London, 1935.) I would guess that there are very few nomads or semi-nomads in Syria or the Lebanon. However, once experience with tribal registration has been gained in Jordan, it could be extended elsewhere.

H. Administration

The project will obviously be jointly administered by Glubb Pasha and Marsack. In view of the special nature of the work, I suggest, without wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of the Agency, that Marsack should depend directly from Conrad, or his successor, without any intermediary. Most of the necessary staff will fortunately be provided by Glubb but Marsack will need the use of a good English and Arabic typist from time to time. He will require a "Land Rover" or other transport permanently at his disposal unless this can be provided by Glubb Pasha. As indicated in B (ii) above, he will require from time to time the help of the Registration Department. He should be in close contact with the Statistical and Registration Department at H.Q. in connection with movements of tribesmen across frontiers - when this can be traced.

/3.

3. **Timing**

A. The timing of this operation is important and complex. Owing to our ignorance of the composition of our refugee tribesmen we are completely in the dark even about the approximate numbers of semi-nomads, so it is difficult to start any operation until the survey is completed. Yet the various operations must be timed to fit the seasons. The sowing should be done in early November and so the water-spreading operations must be largely completed by then. The tribes should start moving out in early December so that they must be equipped by then. If stock is to be purchased in Iraq it cannot be done much before early October but must be completed by December. And so on.

An essential move to save waste of time later would be to decide at the first meeting the maximum total figure expendible on a family, including range improvement etc. Conrad suggests £1,300.

B. A first tentative Time-table

Timing	Operation
Now to June 27th	Marsack, de Briey and Myers to confer. Statistical office prepare first draft of tribal cards. (I have discussed this with de Briey.)
June 27th	Marsack goes to Amman to confer with Glubb; Delbès, Leroy and Eagan (with interpreter) to confer with Molohon and to go over the ranges. (Transport.)
June 30th	Keen and Myers to Amman.
July 1st-2nd	General Meeting: Glubb, Keen, Conrad, Marsack, Myers, Delbès, Eagan, Leroy, Arab Legion Officer, with Shuhaiba (or who have you) on call. Ranges Meeting: Glubb, Walpole, Keen Conrad, Marsack, Molohon, Myers, Delbès, Leroy.
July 3rd	Beirut party returns. Operation starts.
July 3rd-31st	Completion of tribal cards, plans for census.
August 1st-3rd	Census
August 4th-14th	Collation, compilation results, checking.
August 15th	Decision on offer to be made.
August 16th-20th	Purchase of a few complete outfits to have on show at each camp where offer is being made. (If any reduction in rations is made, it would be well-timed at this point.)
August 21-Sept. 31	Offers to be made
August 30th	First estimate of numbers likely to accept.
August 31st	Order farming machinery, seed, livestock etc. (Will someone please /check

Timing	Operation
	check with Supply time required for orders of machinery to arrive.) Plan range improvement and start work on it.
Sept. 31st	Final numbers known. Expand range plans and work. Complete orders.
Early November	Sowing.
Early December	"They're Off!".

4. For distribution, please see below.

Yours sincerely,

(O. H. MYERS)

Distribution:

UNRWA (6)

Adcom (4)

Amman (3)

F.O. (2)

APPENDIX A

SUGGESTION FOR RUBBER STAMP TO USE ON BACK OF CARDS AND ON INVESTIGATION FACT SHEET TO REPLACE HEADING "OCCUPATION"

A. AFFILIATION

Tribe and Division	Sheikhs
Qabîlah	
'Ashîrah	
Fakhadh or Batn, etc.	
'Aîlah or Baît, etc.	

B. NOMADISM

Whether inhabited tent or house?

Whether owned land personally?

How Much?

Whether cultivated tribally-owned land?

Number of Animals:

- Camels
- Horses
- Cattle
- Sheep
- Goats
- Chickens

APPENDIX B

VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF EQUIPMENT FOR A BEDAWI FAMILY

1. 10-12 sheep (say 12)
   2 donkeys or camels

2. 10-15 sheep
   2 donkeys or camels

3. 1 Naja Hamlah — JD22.5
   50 Sheep — 250.0
   272.5 = ₰763

1 Tent	£S450
1 Saddle	25
1 Saddle Bag	25
4 Firwahs	40
4 Sandals	15
Cooking vessels	5
Hurricane Lamp	3
	563 = ₰154

   ₰917 say ₰925

4. | | | | |
   |---|---|---|---|
   | 2 Naja Hamlahs | | £L800 | |
   | 1 donkey | | 70 | |
   | 50 sheep | | 3,000 | |
   | 1 tent | | 350 | |
   | 'Abayahs, firwas, mattresses etc. | say, | 150 | |
   | | | 4,370 | |
   | | Say, | 4,350 | = ₰1,235 |

   Income

Butter, 250 kilos	@ £L4	=	£L1,000
Wool 50 "	" 3	=	150
Lambs 10	" 20	=	200
1 camel calf	" 100	=	100
			£L1,450

5. 2 camels @ £S400
   35 sheep " 25
   £S425 = ₰457

APPENDIX C

The following suggestions have been made by various people for the 150 m/m to 200 m/m rains area:-

Wimmera Rye Grass (Lolium Rigidum)
Harding's Grass (Filarius Tuberosum)
Bulbous Rye Grass (Hordeum Bulbosum)
Rhodes Grass (?)

It might be worth adding:-

Subterranean Clover (Trifoleum Subterraneum)

because, although it does not yield satisfactory forage below 300 m/m rainfall, it may well improve the grasses planted with it. Hardinge's grass and Bulbous Rye are native to Jordan. Wimmera has been nursery-tested by Dayoe in Syria and found very satisfactory; it requires 8-10 lbs. seed per acre and if rains come normally in mid-November it should provide grazing from December 1st to May 1st, and should increase pasturage by 200% to 300%. Delbès has some reserve about the seed being harmful to stock. Kochia Indica has been found to be an excellent fodder and to grow well in these parts, but my own experiments with it seem to show it is a water-loving plant, contrary to early reports from Egypt. The experts may have something to say on this.

If there is any pasturage, such as land too stony and rough for arable in the 300-400 m/m rain belt, perennials, Weeping Love Grass and Burr Clover could be tried.

For the lowest rainfall areas, protected plantations of Mesquite (Prosopis Juliflorum) yields pods which make excellent forage, and the various Artemesias, particularly Artemesia Herba Alba, could be sown on the ranges if seed is available.

In addition to actual range improvement, much might be done to provide forage by planting various clovers with the cereals, which can be grazed after the harvest and also improve the grain yield. This has been successfully tried by Dayoe in Syria.

Present address of Family, in Full .....

Type of Accommodation Occupied .....

Rent Paid (if any) .....

Details of Identity Documents «if any» in Possession of Family

No. of Family «Head, Wife, Child, No. etc.»	Description of Document	Place and Date of Issue

OCCUPATION

Member of Family	Normal Trade or Calling	Present occupation (if ony)
Head of Family		
Wife		
Child. No.		
" "		
" "		
" "		
Dependant No.		
" "		
" "		

Present Income «if any» of Members of the family

Member of Family (Head, Wife, Child. No etc.	Description	Amount

Details of property (i. e. Houses, Fields Workshops, Funds) Previously or at Present Held by Members of the family

Member	Description	Location
Head		
wife		
Child. No.		
" "		
" "		
Dependant No.		
" "		

Short Refugee History of Family

REPORT OF INVESTIGATORS

Member	Description	Location

Signature ..... Date of Investigation .....

FINDING OF AREA OFFICER

Signature ..... Date .....

RECOMMENDATION OF REGISTRATION OFFICER

Signature ..... Date .....

DECISION OF CHIEF OF REGISTRATION & STATISTICS

Signature ..... Date .....

U. N. R. W. A. P. R.

REFUGEES, INVESTIGATION FACT SHEET

LEBANON

Area ..... New Registration No. .....

Religion of Family ..... Old Registration No. .....

Nationality of Family .....

(The above numbers are NOT to be inserted by Investigators)

Members of Family	Sex	Age	Relationship to Head of Family	Place of Residence before conflict: Village	Place of Residence before conflict: District.
Head of Family (Family name first)					
Wife's Maiden Name (Family name first)					
Children					
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
6					
7					
8					
9					
0					

Dependants (Family names first)	Description	Member of Family (Head, Wife, Child, No. etc.
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Total Number of Persons in the Family .....

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/50

FROM

Mr Myers,
Beirut –
to Miss Waterlow

No. AC. 100/5.

Dated 17.6-52.

Received in Registry— 28.6-52.

Resettlement in Iraq.

An UNRWA Placement Officer is at the moment working with Count Knuth in Bagdad. News of Iraq Development schemes is being passed onto UNRWA.

References

EE1824/36
21

MINUTES

CW 3/7.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Mr Couldrey,
B/Trade for Miss Waterlow
3 July

(Action completed)

4/7

(Index)

16/10

41070

(AC 100/5)

CONFIDENTIAL

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

17th June, 1952.

EE 1826/50

Dear Miss Waterlow,

Please refer to your EE 1826/21 of the 13th June, 1952.

2. The position at present is that UNRWA has a Placement Officer working in Bagdad and that, together with Count Knuth, he is doing his best to place as many refugees as possible in Iraq.

3. The Placement Service at H.Q. is making sample surveys of various groups of refugees in Jordan to obtain a better classification of trade skills.

4. Any time that I see in the Economic Report from Iraq notices about new development schemes I pass these on to UNRWA so that they may be suitably prepared for action.

5. I shall be enquiring to-day as to the numbers of persons placed in Iraq and this figure will appear in my telegram in reply to your telegram No. 464 of the 16th June, 1952.

EE1824/36

Yours ever,

O. H. Myers

(O. H. MYERS)

Miss C. M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Middle East Secretariat,

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

EE 1826/50. OUTFILE

3rd July, 1952.

I am writing to you on the question of the employment of Arab refugee labour by British contractors in Iraq.

2. The position is that the Iraqi Prime Minister has informed Mr Blandford, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, of his agreement to contractors who are carrying out major projects in Iraq employing Arab refugees to undertake skilled and semi skilled work for which Iraqis are not available. He told the Director that he realised there would very soon be a shortage of such labour for development work in Iraq and he also agreed that individual refugees trained by U.N.R.W.A. in technical skills could be admitted into Iraq.

3. U.N.R.W.A. now have a Placement Officer working in Bagdad in collaboration with Count Knuth, who is the Agency's representative in Iraq. This Officer's task is to find jobs for as many refugees as possible in Iraq through the Placement Service established by the Agency at Beirut.

4. We should be grateful if you would bring these arrangements to the attention of British contractors who are carrying out development projects in Iraq in order that they may instruct their local managers to make use of refugee labour as far as possible. You may

R.C.Couldrey, Esq., OBE.,
Commercial Relations &
Exports Department,
Board of Trade,
S.W. 1.

/care to inform .....

care to inform contractors of the importance which the Foreign Office attach to finding work opportunities, however temporary, for the Arab refugees.

(C. Waterlow.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... FO .....

Class ..... 371 .....

Piece ..... 98512 .....

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

EE. 1826/515

Greasy

16/4/82

IN PLACE

19/7/07

To travel by locked box only, and to be returned to Green Division for custody.

EASTERN

PALESTINE

EE1826/51 /G

(1) 1952

FROM Foreign Office Minute (Miss Waterlow)

Top Secret

No.

Dated 20 May

Received in Registry— 1 July

Criticism of UNRWA activities in the Middle East.

(encloses a report communicated by Mr. Chapman Andrews)

References

See MINUTES within

(~~See also~~ UNE Dept. @ 18/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) JR 21/7

(Index) [illegible]

41070

Mr. Chapman Andrews

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

Ete 9

E

TOP SECRET

Mr Clapman-Andrews asked me to hand you the attached paper, which he had received from the Friends friends. He leaves it to you whether to show it to Sir H. Knight. He does not want it back.

C Waterlow
26/5

Mr Evans

This is a good report though the writer probably does not fully appreciate the implications of the problem e.g. transfer of refugees (& consequently negotiations with Syria) is vital.

He does not appreciate that M. Blandford is as keen as M. Robbins on vocational training. The point at issue is where i.e. in Syria or in existing camps M. Blandford ~~is~~ rightly puts the emphasis on the former. Miss Waterlow

E E 1826/51 G

RECEIVED IN C.B.
1 - JUL 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
2 July

P.S. Publicity now might made the Syrian ~~difficult~~ negotiations more tricky. JK.

(30276) G.S.St.

SUMMARY OF PAPER ON UNRWA ACTIVITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The activities of UNRWA are paralysed by lack of direction and a bottleneck at the top:

1. Heads of Departments are unable to carry out their proper functions as letters and proposals do not receive/prompt attention and he is inaccessible personally owing to his absorption in negotiations with the Arab Governments.

/the Director's

2. The Director, Mr. J.B. BLANDFORD, Jnr., and his senior staff do not see eye to eye on policy. The more the latter decline to share his views the less he has consulted them or been available to discuss their problems.

3. Everything has been sacrificed to his lone effort to "sell" the three-year plan to the Arab States - and SYRIA in particular - while measures which might influence the success of the negotiations are left undone.

The effects are stagnation, waste and misuse of money and manpower. The international heads of three departments in BEIRUT H.Q. have resigned and others are about to follow suit.

It should be pointed out that it is only in the field of reintegration that confused direction of policy has taken its toll. The administration of relief is well organised and carried out with a minimum of waste and corruption.

II. THE MAIN 'LEFT-UNDONES'

Chief among the measures which could have been taken are:

(i) A propaganda and press campaign turned on at the right moment

(ii) Development of constructive educational and vocational training programmes

(iii) The development to a successful conclusion of any one of the agricultural resettlement projects at present in progress in JORDAN.

Reasons for the omissions:

(i) No Public Relations Policy

The proposals put forward after the Director's return from the General Assembly in PARIS by M. F. EYRIEY, the French public relations advisor for a public relations policy were ignored for a time and finally rejected; the P.R.A. again submitted proposals, which included the calling of a meeting of UNRWA representatives to all the Arab countries and others, and three months later these were agreed in principle, though the meeting has not yet taken place. In the interim there has been virtually no public relations policy. The only exception is JORDAN, where the P.R.O. has a small monthly financial allocation. The repeated appeals of the UNRWA representative to SYRIA for a similar allocation are still pending.

(ii) Deficiencies of the Education Programme

A Canadian expert in education was seconded from OTTAWA six months ago. He has resigned in protest against the Agency's policy and in the hope that his resignation may call attention to wrongs which his presence could never correct.

ROBBINS original directive was cancelled after some months, when he was told to prepare at high speed a 'wholesale educational plan' to accompany reintegration of refugees in SYRIA - for which however he was not able to obtain essential data owing to the delicate negotiations in progress with SYRIA.

ROBBINS's recommendations for next year's budget for school has been turned down. He complains that the standard of teaching in UNRWA/UNESCO schools is unsatisfactory - and one by one all the best teachers are finding employment elsewhere.

ROBBINS is under constant pressure to organise concentrated vocational training courses to last for half to quarter of the normal time: the results will be some hundreds or thousands of half-trained boys.

(iii) Haphazard Planning of Agricultural Settlements

Two agricultural resettlement schemes, of inestimable value, involving the construction of model villages and cultivation of new land, are in progress in JORDAN. In each case there has been no coherent plan, no particular care has been taken in choosing the new settlers or in assisting them to make their new enterprise succeed, and confusion is widespread.

III. CONCLUSION

In order to remedy the deficiencies set forth in II above:

(i) Funds should be made available for PRO activities in SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON, GAZA; a small allocation should be made if necessary to the CAIRO and BAGHDAD Arab press.

(ii) Academic and technical standards should be maintained and the time-limit on technical courses should not be imposed.

(iii) A number of agricultural resettlement schemes, including resettlement on private land, should be carried out in JORDAN and, at the risk of establishing a higher standard than it might be possible to maintain later, no stone left unturned to make them a success.

In SYRIA the Agency should proceed to "make self-supporting" the 80,000 refugees already there before laying too much stress on large-scale transfers of population.

The signing on the dotted line of any total reintegration plan is probably impracticable in present circumstances; a better policy at first would probably be for the Agency to accomplish what it can wherever it can. A period of actions and not words is the only solution.

Source's criticism of the Director is directed only against the bottleneck and maladministration which has resulted from his methods and source is not in a position to judge the Director's conduct of negotiations with the Arab Governments. Source considers it is regrettable that better use could not be made of the exceptional administrative abilities of the Deputy Director, Mr. James KEEN.

I. PRESENT STAGNATION OF UNRWA ACTIVITIES

The activities of UNRWA are becoming increasingly paralysed by a bottleneck and lack of direction at the top.

The international heads of three departments in BEIRUT H.Q. have resigned and others are about to follow suit as they find themselves unable to carry out their proper functions. Letters and proposals awaiting the Director's approval lie for weeks unattended to and often never get answered at all, while BLANDFORD himself is absorbed in the lone negotiations which he has been carrying out with the Arab Governments.

This situation is not new, but has been developing gradually since the passing of the last resolution on Arab Refugees by the General Assembly in January 1952.

BLANDFORD returned from PARIS full of confidence which was not shared by his senior staff. They had already expressed to him by cable their concern at the amendments to the resolution which was finally voted, and which in their opinion would leave the Arab States free to withhold their cooperation at any moment.

BLANDFORD, however, was nothing daunted and embarked with renewed vigour upon his negotiations with the Arab Governments, while trying to engender into his staff the 'Psychology of success'. Minor pinpricks, he said, or the daily obstacles put in the way of the Agency's operation by Arab authorities were of little consequence in comparison to the major issues at stake.

It may be argued that the generous minded and optimistic manner of his approach constituted the best chance of success. In the eyes of James KEEN and his senior staff however, his disinclination to face facts and adopt a firm line were simply attributed to wishful thinking or intellectual dishonesty.

The more they declined to share in his optimism, the less he consulted them, or was available to discuss their problems, while tightening the bottleneck until things have now been left to follow their present rudderless course.

Everything has been sacrificed to the effort to 'sell' the three-year plan to the ARAB STATES- and SYRIA in particular. No one could try harder, but it is a lone effort mustering none of the possible elements which could help to weigh the scales in favour of reintegration.

II. THE LEFT UNDONES

Chief among these elements are

(i) A propaganda and press campaign turned on at the right moment

(ii) Development of constructive educational and vocational training programmes

(iii) The development to a successful conclusion of any one of the agricultural resettlement projects at present in progress in JORDAN.

An analysis of the reason for these omissions will explain better than anything else the cause of paralysis.

(i) No Public Relations Policy

Shortly after the Director's return from PARIS, Francois EYRIEY, French public relations advisor, envisaging the need for a Public Relations policy in support of the negotiations with SYRIA, put forward various proposals to the Director. These were for a time ignored and finally turned down as involving unnecessary expense.

EYRIEY was told to think again. He came back with a memorandum analysing all possible means of influencing refugee and Arab opinion and suggesting that an immediate meeting be called of UNRWA representatives to all the Arab countries, their PROs, and the heads of the Education and other divisions concerned with the Director in the chair to formulate a coordinated policy.

Three months elapsed before an answer was forthcoming at the end of May to this proposal, which was agreed in principle although no meeting has yet taken place. In the interim BLANDFORD could spare practically no time to see EYRIEY, who was given no directives, and whose only information as to the attitude to be adopted towards the press was derived from the few occasions when he was present at interviews given by the Director to foreign newspaper correspondents.

As a result, there was virtually no public relations policy as far as Arab opinion was concerned, and the press has sought every opportunity to attack the Agency, publish false accusations and discredit its new programme.

The only exception is the case of JORDAN, where the P.R.O. has a monthly allocation of JD 400 at his disposal for the insertion of paid advertisements and announcements of interest to refugees. Although this sum is never used directly to pay for articles favourable to the agency, its judicious use is enough to enable the PRO to reduce criticism, suppress false rumours and present the reintegration programme in a more favourable light.

That similar results could have been obtained in SYRIA is highly probable. The editor of ALEF BA and other papers have made it clear on a number of occasions that favourable articles on the Agency would be published the minute that some degree of financial support was forthcoming. They have declined to publish Agency press communiques on account of its absence.

The practice of spending JD.400 for public relations in JORDAN and nothing elsewhere has been questioned by EYRIEY and the UNRWA representative to SYRIA, Dr. De PAGE, has appealed repeatedly for some allocation. The matter is however still pending.

(ii) Deficiencies of the Education Programme

The one field of activity where no obstacles stand in the way and where UNRWA would win support on all sides is in education and vocational training.

A Canadian civil servant and expert in Education, J.E. ROBBINS, was seconded from OTTAWA six months ago with a view to improving educational facilities for refugees. He has now tendered his resignation in protest against the Agency's policy.

The sum allocated for education last year amounted to some 2% of total Agency expenditure. On the understanding that this sum would be increased, ROBBINS was told to work on a plan for expansion of schools and increased vocational training. After a few months, he was informed that he should forget about the existing situation in camps, and concentrate on a 'wholesale educational plan' to accompany the reintegration of refugees in SYRIA. Given the delicate state of UNRWA's negotiations with SYRIA at that time, he could receive no information as to the manner of reintegration, location of new settlements, or number of families involved, except on a purely hypothetical basis. Yet his plan had to be prepared at high speed for use as a possible bait in the discussions in progress.

In the meantime his recommendations for next year's budget for schools have been turned down. "They don't want anyone here who is interested in education", he told source, "they just want a puppet to play the game of bluff".

UNRWA passes off the deficiencies of its educational programme by pointing out that the percentage of refugee children receiving education must not exceed that of the host countries. Accordingly it is stated that the percentage of

children being educated (May 1952 figures) in LEBANON 60%, SYRIA 50%, GAZA 50% and JORDAN 35% compares not unfavourably with local conditions.

This argument according to ROBBINS does not hold when it is considered

(a) that the bulk of the refugees cannot possibly be re-settled in the countries where they are at present living.

(b) that it consequently serves no purpose to make such a comparison.

(c) that the children left uneducated in Arab countries grow up among families where at an early age they learn at least to work or ply some craft - unlike non-school going refugee children who do nothing and see only idleness around them.

ROBBINS further complains that the standard of teaching in UNRWA/UNESCO schools is unsatisfactory and is fast deteriorating. Given the shortage of teachers throughout the MIDDLE EAST and the fact that UNRWA teachers' salaries are only a little above half local rates, one by one all the best teachers are finding employment elsewhere.

Where vocational training is concerned, ROBBINS is under constant pressure to organise concentrated training courses to last for half to a quarter of the normal time. The Director's concern, he says, is clearly the propaganda value of the operation and not whether the children on completing the course would be able to find employment.

ROBBINS foresees the result to be some hundreds or thousands of half-trained boys all thinking they know their job, but who will be doomed to rapid disillusionment.

A case in point is the course for 50 boys at KUBBEH school for mechanics and electricty run by Benedictine

monks in TRIPOLI. Here the normal 18 months course is to be accomplished in nine months. For the first two months, delays in furnishing tools and equipment resulted in the boys doing only bookwork as the workshop could not be set up for the practical side of their training. The bare essentials have now arrived and the course has been running for four months, but according to the Benedictine father in charge, training is still prejudiced by insufficient equipment, and in his opinion the children cannot be fully trained in so short a time.

The case of ROBBINS may be cited as typical of that of a number of able and conscientious international members of the Agency's staff, whose activities are discredited by incapable direction. He had represented CANADA at the UNESCO Conference in 1949, and it was the plight of refugee children in the camps that he saw then that induced him to leave his work in OTTAWA. His hope is now that his resignation may call attention to wrongs which his presence could never correct. His views were neither sought nor listened to by BLANDFORD, who would summon him only in order to subject him to a harangue.

(iii) Haphazard Planning of Agricultural Settlements

Two agricultural resettlement schemes involving the construction of 'model villages' and cultivation of new land are in progress in JORDAN. They are regarded as 'Pilot projects' by the Agency, and if only they could be successful, they would be of inestimable value both as an indication that UNRWA meant business and as an inducement to the refugees themselves to accept reintegration.

The sites are on State land at MARJ NAAJA, 50 miles North of JERICO in the JORDAN Valley and BEIT QAD, near JENIN.

Source maintains that there has been no coherent plan in either case, that no particular care has been taken in choosing the new settlers or in assisting them to make their new enterprise succeed and that on probing into detail on the spot, confusion was widespread.

A condition for the allocation of funds for this settlement was that the refugees should farm on a cooperative basis. This unwelcome condition was agreed to by the refugees who would have accepted anything in order to get the land. It appears that little or nothing was committed to paper, however, for when the then UNRWA Cooperative Officer left and his place was taken by Joseph BRAIR, a refugee, and former Arab Cooperative Officer under the Mandate, the latter could find no record of the rules of the societies, or of any policy decisions on the nature of the cooperatives to be established. He further received little or no guidance at UNRWA's Jordan H.Q.

In MARJ NAAJA it was planned that three new wells should irrigate 600 Dunnums to be divided among 30 families. A well built 'model village' is nearing completion consisting of 34 houses (4 for non-landowners engaged in village crafts), and the chosen refugees are already living there on the spot in tents.

Throughout construction doubts were expressed by the engineer responsible for the housing plan, by the refugees themselves, and above all by the Arab Agricultural Assistant ASFOUR as to whether a family could live on 20 Dunnums and whether the land would get enough water.

It appears now that ASFOUR has at last been listened to and that according to revised estimates the land and water available will suffice only to support ten families farming

50 Dunnums each. Twenty houses will then have been built in vain.

The case of ASFOUR is revealing. Trained at ABERYSTWYTH Agricultural College and also in UTAH State Agricultural College he has worked for eighteen months with UNRWA, and was genuinely anxious to work for his own people in promoting agricultural resettlement. Completely disillusioned he has now resigned from UNRWA, and got a job with the Colonial Office in BRITISH HONDURAS.

Neither the Co-operatives Officer nor ASFOUR, the Agency members directly concerned with the social and agricultural problems of the new communities, were allowed a voice in the choice of the new settlers. Already in MARJ NAAJA there are complaints about two families who appear to be assuming the role of political agitators to wreck the scheme.

It is in Jordan alone that the Agency could have accomplished agricultural resettlement and Public opinion there was expectant. When in April the country was divided into four areas for reintegration purposes and a Resettlement officer appointed to each to sound landowners and refugees as to the willingness of both sides for resettlement on private land, the response was widespread.

"Now we will see whether they are ever going to do anything" was the typical comment among refugees and Jordanians alike.

Later reports are, however, that this policy has also been temporarily abandoned.

In a confidential report of 1st May HALIM BEY SABA UNRWA PRO in Jordan cited the case of the Jordan Deputy for Bethlehem, who wanted refugees settled on his land. "His line of approach was that his application had been outstanding for 28 months, during which time numerous visits and reports upon the possibilities of the land were made, but to no result. He claims that the Agency does not seem to be serious in its attempts at resettlement, nor towards the policy which it had announced in that respect. This was his impression after a long period

of experience and he was prepared to leave no stone unturned in making this known to the refugees and others who are interested in the execution of the resettlement scheme".

This case may not be a genuine one, his land may be unsuitable, the conditions of resettlement unfavourable, or political consideration may be against him, but the fact remains that there is not a single agricultural resettlement scheme in good working order to show for the Agency's activities in Jordan.

III. INEFFICIENCY LIMITED TO REINTEGRATION PROJECTS

It would be to create an entirely false impression to let it be assumed that such confusion exists throughout the work of UNRWA. The Agency's activities are divided into two distinct branches - Relief and Reintegration.

The administration of relief is well organised and carried out with a minimum of waste and corruption. It is indeed probably the eradication of any form of palm-greasing which is responsible for the majority of attacks directed against the Agency's distribution of supplies.

It is in the field of reintegration and anything bordering upon that unwelcome subject that Blandford's faltering and confused direction of policy has taken its toll.

As regards the UNRWA staff itself engaged in "Reintegration", source believes them to be generally able, and in no way to blame. This is particularly true of the technical staff, surveyors, agricultural advisers, engineers and architects, who in the course of their frustrative efforts of the last eighteen months have nevertheless gained a wealth of experience in the field.

In the building of MARJ NAAJA model village, experiments have been made in construction in local stone, mud brick and concrete, in timberless roofing by means of domes and vaults and in a new irrigation system. The technical staff are ready to build well and cheaply as soon as they get a chance.

IV. CONCLUSION

Within the admittedly narrow limits of possibility UNRWA should proceed immediately to remedy the deficiencies set forth in II above.

Funds should be made available for PRO activities in all areas where UNRWA operates, in order of preference: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza. The Cairo and Baghdad Arab press should no longer be ignored and a small allocation be made available if necessary.

As regards (ii) and (iii), the object should be to get some tangible and honest results. This would soon dispel the impression that all is bluff and salestalk. In educational and vocational training decent academic and technical standards should not be sacrificed. It should be pointed out here that the deadline time limit imposed which appears to preclude any courses lasting longer than a few months is a serious handicap.

Without further ado a number of agricultural resettlement schemes should be carried out in Jordan, including resettlement on private land. No stone should be left unturned in making these initial projects a success, even at the risk of establishing a higher standard than it might be possible to maintain later, when reintegration has gained momentum.

To seek a straightforward acceptance of any total reintegration plan signed on the dotted line in present circumstances may be impracticable.

A piecemeal approach whereby the Agency should accomplish whatever it can wherever it can, might be at first the best policy.

In Syria, where alone the ultimate solution is to be found, the Agency might nevertheless proceed to "make self-supporting" the 80,000 refugees already there, before laying too much stress on large scale transfers of population.

The realisation of such a "first phase" would do much to modify present difficulties. The news that refugees anywhere

were getting land would spread like wildfire in the camps and although protests against reintegration might increase, motives of self-interest would certainly outweigh the polemics of political agitators.

Ultimately the demand for resettlement would come from the refugees themselves.

It would go a long way to placate public opinion, if it were made clear that every effort was being made to settle the refugees in West Jordan first, and thereafter outwards as near to Palestine as possible.

With regard to Blandford himself, source's criticism is directed only against the bottleneck and maladministration which has resulted from his methods. Source is in no position to pass judgement upon the Director's conduct of negotiations with the Arab governments, but believes that his indefatigable optimism, perseverence, and generous mindedness, are qualities which cannot be overrated or lightly cast aside.

It is regrettable that better use could not be made of the exceptional administrative abilities of the Deputy Director James Keen.

In conclusion, much stress has been laid by the Director on how the three year plan should be described. It has been called successively "Reintegration", "Resettlement" "Self-Support" and the present formula (since beginning of June) is in his own words "Improving the refugees' living conditions by means of training, loans and employment with the use of government facilities supplied by the Agency".

The play with words hoodwinks nobody and the Arabic has remained throughout توطين or ("settlement").
A period of actions and not words is the only solution.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826 | 52.

FROM

Mr Chadwick
Tel Aviv.
to Mr Evans.

No. 10108/64/52.

Dated 30-6-52

Received in Registry— 2-7-52.

Cessation of relief in Israel.

Report on his talks with Comay on Israel's assuming of the responsibility for refugees in Israel.

References

-/43.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dfd Ch. Tel Aviv, for MEI 2 Aug.

(Action completed) [signature] 8

(Index) 10/10

MINUTES

The reference unfortunately appears to be missing. We have suggested that it would be desirable that UNRWA should retain some responsibility for keeping a watching eye on the welfare of these refugees integrated into Israel, in view of the Israelis' unsatisfactory record in the Treatment of their Arab minority.

Mr Pullar
E-Dept.

C Waterlow
30/7

Is it known if these refugees have become Israel citizens under the new law, or are they exempt from its provisions?

H. McPulear 31/7

CW 2/8.

See with
A) Mr Myers, Beirut to Miss Waterlow (AC.178 of 20 Aug.)

41070

[signature] 27/8

E. Dept thank you.
HMP 28/8

E1826/52.

Ente E

CONFIDENTIAL

British Legation,

Tel Aviv.

10108
~~18201~~/64/52

30th June, 1952.

Dear Trefor,

I think Sir Henry Knight has given you an account of his discussions with Israel officials during his visit to Tel Aviv at the beginning of May. About a fortnight ago I had an opportunity of speaking to Comay about the problem of taking over from UNRWA the Arab refugees in Israel, saying that I understood that the UNRWA representative here, while agreeing in principle, was somewhat concerned about the welfare of the many social cases among the Arab refugees. Comay said he was aware of this and that inter-departmental discussions were in progress to decide what steps had to be taken to deal with the refugees when Israel took over. He pointed out that in his letter to Mr. Blandford on the subject he had made it plain that Israel would not simply take over the responsibilities of UNRWA but that when UNRWA ceased to operate in Israel there would be no more refugees here. Social cases would, therefore, have to be dealt with thereafter by the welfare organisations in Israel and the inter-departmental committee was considering what special steps would need to be taken to provide for them. The first necessity was to make a detailed survey of the refugees, who were scattered in the villages, and the UNRWA representative had only recently supplied a complete list.

2. Last week, Comay told me that Mr. James Kean, the Deputy Director of UNRWA, had called on him to ask that the Israel Government should take over the refugees in Israel with effect from the 1st July. Comay had replied that the detailed work of sharing out the various responsibilities among the different government departments could not possibly be completed in time. Kean then suggested that UNRWA would be prepared to lend their staff and supplies in Israel to the Israel Government from the 1st July until they had their own arrangements in working order. Comay resisted this suggestion, pointing out that the Israel Government intended to deal with the ex refugees in an entirely different method and it would be very awkward for them to take over for a short period and then make a complete change in the method of dealing with them. However, on Kean's insistence he promised to think it over further. I do not know what his final reply was, but I must say that if I were in Comay's position I would turn the suggestion down.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and Greenhill.

Yours ever

John Chadwick

(J. E. Chadwick.)

T. E. Evans Esq., O.B.E.,

Middle East Secretariat,

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

(EE 1826/52)
CONFIDENTIAL

OUTFILE

2nd August, 1952.

Dear Chancery,

We refer to Chadwick's letter No. 10108/64/52 of the 30th June about the arrangements for handing over responsibility for the Arab refugees in Israel to the Israeli Government.

We should be glad to know whether these refugees will become Israeli citizens under the new law or are they exempt from its provisions?

We should also be glad to know whether, in your view, they can be left to their fate by U.N.R.W.A. without undue disquiet? The suggestion in earlier correspondence that the Agency should maintain a small foothold in Israel by, for example, the appointment of a Technical Assistance Liaison Officer, from which they could keep an eye on the welfare of their late charges strikes us as rather a good one.

We are sending copies of this letter to Myers at Beirut and the Chancery at Washington.

Yours ever,

MIDDLE EAST SECRETARIAT.

The Chancery,
British Legation,
Tel Aviv.

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

(AC 178)

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter E.

E

20th August, 1952.

E 1826/52.

Dear Miss Waterlow,

With reference to your letter No. 1826/52 of the 2nd August, 1952, to Tel Aviv, Blandford tells me that Huber, Country Representative in Israel, states that since the 14th July, 1952, the Arab Refugees have full Israeli citizenship with the same rights as the Jews.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/53

FROM

UNRWA,

Beirut

D M Evans.

No. AC. 229.

Dated

Received in Registry— 27. 6. 52. 2. 7. 52

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Col. W. Russell

Edmonds, Try for Mrs Waterlow

28 July.

(Action completed) 29/7

(Index) 15/5/54

Resettlement – Syria.

Transmits a memorandum covering a programme of public works in Syria prepared by the Syria Govt.

MINUTES

This is presumably the much quoted "$200 million development programme", the $200 m. being presumably the foreign currency component. The emphasis on irrigation & communications will be noted.

As regards particular projects, the position as known to us can be summarized as follows:

Ghab project. Detailed surveys are being carried out by a Dutch firm. When these are available the I. Bank may be prepared to make a loan.

Roudh project. The Syrians are now financing & carrying this out themselves.

Euphrates projects. The detailed survey carried out by Sir A. Gibb & Partners in 1948 needs to be brought up to date. The I. Bank have suggested to the Syrians that this could be done by Point IV if they would sign an agreement with the Americans. The Bank might give a loan.

41070

Jezirah roads. The I. Bank are offering a loan.

P.T.O.

Lattakia pt. D: Ho.

Hospitals This programme may be assisted by the Ford Foundation.

We shd copy this to the Treasury when the letter asking agreement to our offering a loan to Syria has been sent.

C Watkins
10/7

E-Dept (Mr Rhodes) Path 11/7
ER Dept (Mr Ramsbotham)
General Dept. Mrs. de Zulueta & [illegible]

~~We are~~ Ref: X above. ERD wd like to see this letter before despatch.

P. Ramsbotham
14/7

This letter was cleared with Sir R. Makins. File sent to Mr Ramsbotham.

[illegible] 24/7.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

AA. C. 266

BE

M E M O R A N D U M

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. 715

24 June 1952

TO : Advisory Commission - for information

FROM : Deputy Director

Attached please find a programme of public works in Syria prepared by that Government and handed to the UNRWA Country Representative by the Head of the PARI.

James Keen
Deputy Director

JK/adh

Distribution:

Adcom
Economic Adviser
Legal Adviser
Comptroller
Reports Officer

TRANSLATION

PROGRAMME OF PUBLIC WORKS IN SYRIA

I. Irrigation and hydro-electric engineering

		Estimated cost in Syrian pounds (millions)	Total cost in Syrian pounds (millions)
1.	Ghab project		
	Drainage and reclamation of 40,000 hectares. Generation of electric power. (6000 kilowatts)	60.-	
2.	Roudj project		
	Drainage and irrigation of 4000 hectares. Generation of electric power. (2500 kilowatts)	4.-	
3.	Senn project		
	Irrigation of 5000 hectares. 2000 by gravity and the remaining 3000 by electric pumps.	4.-	
4.	Utilization of the Yarmuk waterfalls		
	Irrigation of 5000 hectares. Generation of electric power. (3-5000 kilowatts)	5.-	
5.	Orontes project		
	Irrigation system for the left bank (8000 hectares)	6.-	
6.	Provision of an irrigation system for the Djagh-Jagh	2.5	
7.	Provision of an irrigation system for the Baligh	3.5	
8.	Development of the Barada valley: flood control, irrigation and generation of power.	30.-	
9.	Khabour projects:		
	Termination of the Tell Maghass irrigation system (left bank, 8,500 hectares)	1.5	
	Provision of an irrigation system on the right bank. (4,500 hectares)	3.5	
	Sabes Kour project. (6,000 hectares)	5.-	
	Taff project. (10,000 hectares)	7.5	
	Construction of the Markada reservoir (800 cu.metres) and development of the Lower Khabour valley	12.5	
		145.-	

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		Estimated cost in Syrian pounds (millions)	Total cost in Syrian pounds (millions)
10.	Euphrates projects		
	B/F	145.-	
	Construction and fitting up of the Yusef Pasha dam.(Reservoir for 1,500,000,000 cu. metres, regularization of the flow and generation of electricity (60,000 kilowatts)	110.-	
	Diversion barrage at Halebieh and irrigation system at Deir Mayadine	30.-	
11.	Nahr el Kabir project: irrigation of 10,000 hectares	10.-	
	Cost of surveys and implementation	15.-	
		310.-	310.-

..../3

II. ROADS	Length kms.	Cost in Syrian pounds (millions)	Total cost in Syrian pounds (millions)
A. Roads in the Jezireh			
1. Kilometre 47-Hassetcheh	47	1.393	
2. Hassetcheh-Kamechlieh	90	4.275	
3. Kamechlieh-Demir Kabou	60	3.060	
4. Demir Kabou - Derik	38	0.238	
5. Demir Kabou - Tel Kouchouk	30	0.360	
6. Kamechlieh-Ras el Ain	120	6.764	
7. Ras el Ain-Hassetcheh	80	4.744	
	465	20.834	
B. Roads in the Ghab area	207	8.000	
C. Roads Tartus-Akkari	24	1.800	
Alternative Bkea	13	1.000	
D. Banias Messiaf-Hama	99	1.616	
		12.416	
E. Sundry Roads			
1. Damascus-Iraqui frontier	200	8.400	
2. Damascus-Kariatin-Palmyra -Deir ez Zor	375	15.750	
3. Homs-Kariatin	85	2.890	
4. Minbij-Ain Arab	70	2.450	
5. Rakka-Tel Abiad	90	4.500	
6. Deir ez Zor-Saour	55	2.475	
7. Sweida-Damascus	85	4.675	
8. Mzerib-Khesfin-Banias	130	7.150	
9. Sednaya-Tawany-Yabroud	35	1.575	
10. Baalbeck-Yabroud-Nasrieh	70	3.150	
		53.015	
F. Bridge on the Euphrates	by contract	4.000	
Rebuilding of the Saour bridge on the Khabour	" "	0.250	
		4.250	
			90.515

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III. Railroads

		Length kms.	Cost per km.	Cost in Syrian pounds (millions)	Total
1.	Aleppo-Raqqa-Deir ez Zor	630	LS.150	95.-	
2.	Damascus-Homs via Forklos	200	150	30.-	
3.	Aleppo-Lattakia	200	300	60.-	
4.	Tel Kalakh-Tartus	50	200	10.-	
5.	Homs-Jisr Choughour	160	250	40.-	
					235.-

IV. Aerodromes

1.	Construction of an aerodrome at Merj Sultan (suburbs of Damascus)	30.-	
2.	Improvements to the Aleppo aerodrome	7.-	
3.	Construction of an aerodrome at Deir ez Zor	8.-	
4.	Improvement of the aerodrome and construction of an airport building at Kamechlieh	3.-	
5.	Improvement of the aerodrome at Hmemim (Lattakia) and construction of an airport building	3.-	51.-

V. Ports

1.	Construction and equipment of the Lattakia port (including cost of equipment)	45.-	
2.	Construction and equipment of a small port at Tartus	3.-	
3.	Equipment and improvement of other landing places in Syria (Aroid, Banias, Djebleh)	2.-	50.-

VI. Hospitals

	A.General Hospitals	No.		
1.	500-bed hospital	4	20.-	
2.	200-bed hospital	18	30.600	
3.	150-bed hospital	21	28.400	
4.	700-bed hospital	8	7.200	
			86.200	

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		No.	Cost in Syrian pounds (millions)	Total cost in Syrian pounds (millions)
	B/F		86,200	
B.	Sanatoriums			
1.	500-bed hospital	1	4.000	
2.	400-bed hospital	1	3.400	
3.	300-bed hospital	1	2.800	
4.	200-bed hospital	1	1.700	
			11.900	
C.	Hospitals for special diseases			
1.	500-bed hospital	2	8.500	
2.	250-bed hospital	2	3.500	
3.	200-bed hospital	5	8.000	
			20.000	
D.	Cancer Institute		1.500	
			1.500	119.600

SUMMARY

		£S millions
I.	Irrigation and hydro-electric engineering	310.-
II.	Roads	90,515
III.	Railroads	235.-
IV.	Aerodromes	51.-
V.	Ports	50.-
VI.	Hospitals	119.600
	GRAND TOTAL	£S. 856.115

95
2.8
190
76 0
266

Draft.

OUTFILE

Registry
No. EE1826/53

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

to
CR. Russell
Edmunds,
Treasury
for
CWatkins.

With reference to the Minister of State's letter of July 18th (EY 1102/16) to the Chancellor requesting authority for our ~~making~~ offering ~~offering~~ some financial assistance to Syria, you may care to see the enclosed copy of an outline programme of public works which the Syrian Government have given to UNRWA. This is presumably the $200 million development programme.

CW 24/7

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
25 JUL 1952
SENT TO TYPE
DESPATCHED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(14487) 2/52 D.L.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th July, 1952.

(EE 1826/53)

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTFILE

With reference to the Minister of State's letter of 18th July (EY 1102/16) to the Chancellor requesting authority for our offering some financial assistance to Syria, you may care to see the enclosed copy of an outline programme of public works which the Syrian Government have given to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This is presumably the £200 million development programme.

(Miss C. Waterlow)

Colonel W. Russell Edmunds, O.B.E., T.D.,
Treasury.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/54

FROM

Mr Chapman-Andrews, Beirut.

No. 390,

Dated 7.7.52.

Received in Registry— 7.7.52.

Resettlement in Libya.

Palestinian candidates are being interviewed for posts in Libya.

Discusses travel documents for refugees.

Rpt. to Benghazi

Last Paper

(Minutes)

The ref. is evidently to a tel. from Benghazi.

[illegible] 7/7

References

African Dept for obs.

FOAAT ✓ we agree [illegible] 15/7

We must leave it to Benghazi, where HM Minister is now in residence

[illegible] 9/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)

[illegible] 17/7

(Action completed) [illegible] 8/7

(Index) [illegible] 24/11

Next Paper

36390

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

?E

E 7826/54

Cypher/OTP

FILES

Mr. Chapman Andrews

No. 390 D: 8.30 a.m. 7th July, 1952.

7th July, 1952. R: 10.23 a.m. 7th July, 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL

? Benghazi ? to Beirut.

NT E

Your telegram No. 7.

Following from Myers.

Several persons have visited here interviewing Palestinian candidates for posts in Libya. In some instances, of which Jarrah is one, candidates have been promised employment by Cyrenaican Administrators and have made all preparations to leave including the selling of their houses and furniture. Moreover ADCOM is pressing UNRWA to speed up the placing of the artisans and negotiations for land settlement.

2. The only travel document which it is possible for refugees in Lebanon to obtain is Lebanese laisser-passer. The Cyrenaican Administrator's ruling therefore constitutes a ban on refugees from this country.

3. Would you please make representations to headquarters.

Foreign Office please pass to Benghazi as my telegram No. 8.

[Repeated to Benghazi].

44444

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/55.

FROM

B.B.C. Monitoring

No.

Dated 28.6.52.

Received in Registry— 2.7.52.

Resettlement.

Arab refugees have stated that they refuse to be settled in any country other than their own.

Last Paper

(*Minutes*)

EW 4/7

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
EW 9/7	

Next Paper

37021

B11 =
XXXXXXXXXXO

B 11 = ARAB REFUGEES WEST OF JORDAN REJECT RESETTLEMENT PLAN =

EK

M.E.S.

(ARAB NEWS AGENCY - CAIRO - 1827) AMMAN: THE ARAB REFUGEES IN NABLUS, HEBRON AND RAMALLAH HAVE STAKED XXXX STATED THAT THEY PREFER TO REMAIN UNDER THEIR PRESENT AFFLICTION RATHER THAN TO ACCEPT ANY PLAN FOR THEIR RESETTLEMENT IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR OWN. THEY ANNOUNCED THEIR DETERMINATION IN THIS MATTER IN A STATEMENT ISSUED IN REPLY TO THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH MR. JOHN BLANDOXXXXXX BLANDFORD, DIRECTOR OF UNRWA, HELD ON 25TH JUNE. MR. BLANDFORD HAD SAID THAT A NEW PLAN HAD BEEN LAID DOWN FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES AND THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF SYRIA, IRAQ AND JORDAN HAD SHOWN GREAT INTEREST IN THE PLAN.

E C 1826/55

END BBC MON. 1915 28/6 DPCL

Jordan

Mr J. M. Hunter
Room 72
Eastern Dept
F.O.

RECEIVED IN O.R.
2 JUL 1952

Resettlement of Arab refugees; programme of resettlement in Syria and Jordan. Code EE file 1826 (papers 34 - 55). 1952. MS Refugee Records from the General Correspondence Files of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office, Record Group 371, 1947-1970 FO 371/98512. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom).